

Agents Behaviour Part II

$$A = \pi r^2$$


$$C = 2\pi r$$

$$V = \frac{1}{3} \pi r^2 h$$




$$V = \pi r^2 h$$

	30°	45°	60°
sin	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{\sqrt{2}}{2}$	$\frac{\sqrt{3}}{2}$
cos	$\frac{\sqrt{3}}{2}$	$\frac{\sqrt{2}}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
tan	$\frac{\sqrt{3}}{3}$	1	$\sqrt{3}$



$$\int \sin x dx = -\cos x + C$$

$$\int \frac{dx}{\cos^2 x} = \tan x + C$$

$$\int \tan x dx = -\ln|\cos x| + C$$

$$\int \frac{dx}{\sin x} = \ln\left|\tan\frac{x}{2}\right| + C$$

$$\int \frac{dx}{a^2 + x^2} = \frac{1}{a} \arctan\frac{x}{a} + C$$

$$\int \frac{dx}{x^2 - a^2} = \frac{1}{2a} \ln\left|\frac{x-a}{x+a}\right| + C$$



$$ax^2 + bx + c = 0$$

$$a\left(x^2 + \frac{b}{a}x + \frac{c}{a}\right) = 0$$

$$x^2 + 2\frac{b}{2a}x + \left(\frac{b}{2a}\right)^2 - \left(\frac{b}{2a}\right)^2 + \frac{c}{a} = 0$$

$$\left(x + \frac{b}{2a}\right)^2 - \frac{b^2 - 4ac}{4a^2} = 0$$

**EXPERIMENT
TIME!!!**



GROUP 1

Site: www.sli.do

Code: 4098567



PROBLEM 1

The Scottish government is planning the next move to fight the next wave of covid-19. The government **expects 12000 people to die** as a consequence of the new wave, and they are **preparing 2 intervention programs**. Which one do you favour?

Program A - if chosen, **4000 people will be saved**


Program B - if chosen, there is **1/3 chance that 12000 people will be saved**, and a **2/3 chance that nobody** will be saved

PROBLEM 2

Suppose that you are asked to participate in one of the following two games, which one would you prefer to play?

Game A - a **sure gain** of **£250**

Game B - **25%** chance to **gain £1000**, **75%** chance to **gain nothing**.



GROUP 2

Site: www.sli.do

Code: 6978580



PROBLEM 1

The Scottish government is planning the next move to fight the next wave of covid-19. The government **expects 12000 people to die** as a consequence of the new wave, and they are **preparing 2 intervention programs**. Which one do you favour?

Program A - if chosen, **8000 people will die**


Program B - if chosen, there is **1/3 chance that nobody will die**, and a **2/3 chance that 12000 people will die**

PROBLEM 2

Suppose that you are asked to participate in one of the following two games, which one would you prefer to play?

Game A - a **sure loss** of **£750**

Game B - **75%** chance to **lose £1000**, **25%** chance to **lose nothing**




Learning outcomes

Learn about **decision-making**

Understand **risk attitudes**

Introduction to **cognitive biases**

Bonus: Become a master of digital marketing



Back to full rationality

Agents are fully informed about the environment

Agents have unbounded time and computational power

Agents are consistent



Back to full rationality

Agents are fully informed about the environment

Agents have unlimited computational power

Agents are consistent

Preferences are well defined



If I prefer
a over b,
and
b over c,
I will prefer
a over c



Me

THE ILLINOIS CO.
RUSSELL PRINCE
CHICAGO
SOLE AGENTS

*Marvelous feats
in Mind Reading.*

PROBLEM 1 (BOTH GROUPS)

Program A - if chosen, **4000 people will be saved**

Program B - if chosen, there is **1/3 chance that 12000** people will be **saved**, and a **2/3 chance that nobody** will be saved

Program A - if chosen, **8000 people will die**

Program B - if chosen, there is **1/3 chance that nobody** will **die**, and a **2/3 chance that 12000 people will die**

PROBLEM 1 (BOTH GROUPS)

Program A - if chosen, **4000 people will be saved**

Program B - if chosen, there is **1/3 chance** that **12000** people will be **saved**, and a **2/3 chance that nobody** will be saved

70%



Program A - if chosen, **8000 people will die**

Program B - if chosen, there is **1/3 chance that nobody** will **die**, and a **2/3 chance that 12000 people will die**

PROBLEM 1 (BOTH GROUPS)

Program A - if chosen, **4000 people will be saved**

Program B - if chosen, there is **1/3 chance that 12000** people will be **saved**, and a **2/3 chance that nobody** will be saved

77%



Program A - if chosen, **8000 people will die**

Program B - if chosen, there is **1/3 chance that nobody** will **die**, and a **2/3 chance that 12000 people will die**

PROBLEM 2 (BOTH GROUPS)

Game A - a **sure gain** of **£250**

Game B - **25%** chance to **gain £1000**, **75%** chance to **gain nothing**.

Game A - a **sure loss** of **£750**

Game B - **75%** chance to **lose £1000**, **25%** chance to **lose nothing**



PROBLEM 2 (BOTH GROUPS)

75%

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PROBLEM 2 (BOTH GROUPS)



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
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

87%




Utility function




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
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
Prospect theory



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$$v(x) = \begin{cases} x^\alpha & \text{if } x \geq 0 \\ -\lambda(-x)^\beta & \text{if } x < 0 \end{cases}$$

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$$v(x) = \begin{cases} x^\alpha & \text{if } x \geq 0 \\ -\lambda(-x)^\beta & \text{if } x < 0 \end{cases}$$

$$\alpha = \beta = 0.88 \quad \lambda = 2.25$$

Financial Example: disposition effect



Traders are **more likely to sell** stock **after** they **gained** value and **less likely** to do so **after** they **lost** value

Heuristics




Tversky and Kahneman

Availability

Representativeness

Anchoring



Tversky and Kahneman

We tend to **overestimate** what's "**available**" in our memory

Availability

Representativeness

Anchoring



Tversky and Kahneman

**“When you have a hammer, everything
is a nail”**



Financial example

Survey in 2012 with thousands of people, who were asked **whether in 2009, 2010, and 2011 the S&P500 index was profitable**



Financial example

Survey in 2012 with thousands of people, who were asked **whether in 2009, 2010, and 2011 the S&P500 index was profitable**

Most people said 2009 was not profitable, whereas in reality it saw one of the **highest returns ever**


Tversky and Kahneman

We fail at computing
conditional probabilities

Availability

Representativeness

Anchoring



Tversky and Kahneman



Steve is very **shy and withdrawn**, invariably **helpful**, but with **little interest in people**. A **meeek and tidy** soul, he has a **need for order and structure**, and a **passion for detail**.

Tversky and Kahneman

What is Steve's job?



Librarian

Farmer


Tversky and Kahneman

Availability

Representativeness


Anchoring

We often choose
a **reference point**



Tversky and Kahneman

ANCHORING EFFECT




The adaptive toolbox

Psychologic plausibility

Domain specific

Ecological rationality



The adaptive toolbox

Psychologic plausibility

The aim is to build a model that
accurately represents the behaviour
of humans



The adaptive toolbox

Domain specific

Heuristics should be **specific to the context**,
rather than general



The adaptive toolbox

Ecological rationality

The success of the heuristic is based on
adaptation to the environment




The adaptive toolbox

Heuristics are composed of three building blocks

Search rules

Stopping rules

Decision rules



Example

Jane wants a job within a **reasonable distance** from Edinburgh

Jane wants a wage of at least w_j

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Stopping: search for jobs within 10km from Edinburgh

Example

Jane wants a job within a **reasonable distance** from Edinburgh

Jane wants a wage of at least w_j

Search: apply for all jobs that offer wage $w_i > w_j + tc$

Stopping: search for jobs within 10km from Edinburgh

Decision: maximise $\pi = w_i - (w_j + tc)$
If $\pi \leq 0 \forall w_i$ do not get any job

Summary

Overview of decision-making processes

Cognitive biases

Heuristics

