

Introduction to Modern Cryptography

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(Slides courtesy of Prof. Jonathan Katz)

Lecture 03, part 2

Perfect Secrecy

Probability Review

Random variable (RV)

Variable that takes on (discrete) values with certain probabilities

Probability distribution (PD)

A PD for a RV specifies the probabilities with which the variable takes on each possible value

- ▶ Each probability must be between **0** and **1**
- ▶ The probabilities must sum to **1**

Probability Review

Event

A particular occurrence in some experiment:

- ▶ $\Pr[E]$: probability of event E

Conditional probability

Probability that one event occurs, given that some other event occurred:

- ▶ $\Pr[A|B] = \Pr[A \text{ and } B]/\Pr[B] \equiv \Pr[AB]/\Pr[B]$

Independence

Two RV X, Y are **independent** if:

- ▶ $\forall x, y : \Pr[X = x|Y = y] = \Pr[X = x]$

Probability Review

Law of total probability

Let $E_1 \dots E_n$ are a partition of all possibilities. Then $\forall A$:

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr[A] &= \sum_i \Pr[A \wedge E_i] \\ &= \sum_i \Pr[A|E_i] \Pr[E_i]\end{aligned}$$

Note

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr[A|B] &= \Pr[A \wedge B]/\Pr[B] \implies \\ \Pr[A \wedge B] &= \Pr[A|B]\Pr[B]\end{aligned}$$

Notation (recall)

- ▶ \mathcal{K} (key space): set of all possible keys
- ▶ \mathcal{M} (message space): set of all possible messages
- ▶ \mathcal{C} (ciphertext space): set of all possible ciphertexts

Probability Distributions

The random variable M

- ▶ M is the *RV* denoting the value of the message
- ▶ M ranges over \mathcal{M} ; context dependent
- ▶ Reflects the likelihood of different messages being sent, given the attacker's **prior knowledge**

Example

$$\Pr[M = \text{attack today}] = 0.7$$

$$\Pr[M = \text{don't attack}] = 0.3$$

Probability Distributions

The random variable K

- ▶ K is the *RV* denoting the key
- ▶ K ranges over \mathcal{K}
- ▶ Fix some encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec)
- ▶ Gen defines a probability distribution for K :

$$\Pr[K = k] = \Pr[\text{Gen outputs key } k]$$

Probability Distributions

RV M and K are independent

Require that parties don't pick the key based on the message,
or the message based on the key

Probability distributions

The random variable C

- ▶ Fix some encryption scheme $(\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$, and some PD for M
- ▶ Consider the following (randomized) experiment:
 - ▶ Generate a key k using Gen
 - ▶ Choose a message m , according to the given PD
 - ▶ Compute $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_k(m)$
- ▶ **This defines a distribution on the ciphertext**
- ▶ Let C be a RV denoting the value of the ciphertext in this experiment

Example 1: the PD of \mathbf{C} (Shift Cipher)

▶ $\forall k \in \{0 \dots 25\} \implies \Pr[K = k] = 1/26$

▶ Let $|M| = 2$, $m \in \{a, z\}$ and

$$\Pr[M = a] = 0.7$$

$$\Pr[M = z] = 0.3$$

▶ What is $\Pr[C = b]$?

Example 1: the PD of \mathbf{C} (Shift Cipher)

What is $\Pr[\mathbf{C} = \mathbf{b}]$?

Either $M = \mathbf{a}$ and $\mathbf{K} = \mathbf{1}$ or $M = \mathbf{z}$ and $\mathbf{K} = \mathbf{2}$

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr[\mathbf{C} = \mathbf{b}] &= \Pr[\mathbf{C} = \mathbf{b} \wedge M = \mathbf{a}] + \Pr[\mathbf{C} = \mathbf{b} \wedge M = \mathbf{z}] \\ &= \Pr[\mathbf{C} = \mathbf{b} | M = \mathbf{a}] \Pr[M = \mathbf{a}] + \\ &\quad + \Pr[\mathbf{C} = \mathbf{b} | M = \mathbf{z}] \Pr[M = \mathbf{z}] \\ &= \Pr[M = \mathbf{a}] \Pr[\mathbf{K} = \mathbf{1}] + \Pr[M = \mathbf{z}] \Pr[\mathbf{K} = \mathbf{2}] \\ &= 0.7 \frac{1}{26} + 0.3 \frac{1}{26} = \frac{1}{26}\end{aligned}$$

Example 2: the PD of C (Shift Cipher)

Let $|M| = 2$, $m \in \{\text{one}, \text{ten}\}$ and

$$\Pr[M = \text{one}] = \Pr[M = \text{ten}] = 1/2$$

What is $\Pr[C = \text{rqh}]$?

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr[C = \text{rqh}] &= \\ &= \Pr[C = \text{rqh} | M = \text{one}] \Pr[M = \text{one}] \\ &+ \Pr[C = \text{rqh} | M = \text{ten}] \Pr[M = \text{ten}] \\ &= \frac{1}{26} \frac{1}{2} + 0 \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{52}\end{aligned}$$

Perfect Secrecy (informal)

Regardless of any **prior** information the attacker has about the plaintext, the ciphertext should leak no **additional** information about the plaintext

- ▶ Attacker's information about the plaintext = attacker-known distribution of M
- ▶ Perfect secrecy means that **observing the ciphertext should not change the attacker's knowledge about the distribution of M**

Perfect Secrecy (formal)

Definition

Encryption scheme $(\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ with message space \mathcal{M} and ciphertext space \mathcal{C} is **perfectly secret** if $\forall PD$ over \mathcal{M} , $\forall m \in \mathcal{M}$, and $\forall c \in \mathcal{C}$ with $\Pr[C = c] > 0$, it holds that

$$\Pr[M = m | C = c] = \Pr[M = m]$$

i.e. the distribution of M does not change conditioned on observing the ciphertext

Example 3: Perfect Secrecy (Shift Cipher)

- ▶ Let

$$\Pr[M = \text{one}] = \Pr[M = \text{ten}] = 1/2$$

- ▶ Take $m = \text{ten}$ and $c = \text{rqh}$. Then

$$\Pr[M = \text{ten} | C = \text{rqh}] = 0 \neq \Pr[M = \text{ten}]$$

- ▶ The *PD* of M changes upon observing the ciphertext

Bayes's theorem

$$\Pr[A|B] = \frac{\Pr[B|A] \Pr[A]}{\Pr[B]}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr[A|B] &= \Pr[AB]/\Pr[B] , \\ \Pr[B|A] &= \Pr[AB]/\Pr[A] \\ \implies \Pr[AB] &= \Pr[B|A]\Pr[A] , \\ \implies \Pr[A|B] &= \frac{\Pr[B|A] \Pr[A]}{\Pr[B]} .\end{aligned}$$

Example 4: Perfect Secrecy and Shift Cipher

Let $|M| = 3$, $m \in \{\text{hi}, \text{no}, \text{in}\}$ and

$$\Pr[M = \text{hi}] = 0.3$$

$$\Pr[M = \text{no}] = 0.2$$

$$\Pr[M = \text{in}] = 0.5$$

What is \Pr of $(M = \text{hi})$ given $(C = \text{xy})$?

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[M = \text{hi} | C = \text{xy}] &= \\ &= \frac{\Pr[C = \text{xy} | M = \text{hi}] \Pr[M = \text{hi}]}{\Pr[C = \text{xy}]} \end{aligned}$$

Example 4: Perfect Secrecy and Shift Cipher

$$\Pr[C = \mathbf{xy} | M = \mathbf{hi}] = 1/26$$

By the law of total probability:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[C = \mathbf{xy}] &= \\ &\Pr[C = \mathbf{xy} | M = \mathbf{hi}] \cdot 0.3 + \\ &\Pr[C = \mathbf{xy} | M = \mathbf{no}] \cdot 0.2 + \\ &\Pr[C = \mathbf{xy} | M = \mathbf{in}] \cdot 0.5 \\ &= (1/26) \cdot 0.3 + (1/26) \cdot 0.2 + 0 \cdot 0.5 = 1/52 \end{aligned}$$

Example 4: Perfect Secrecy and Shift Cipher

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr[M = \text{hi} | C = \text{xy}] &= \\ &= \frac{\Pr[C = \text{xy} | M = \text{hi}] \Pr[M = \text{hi}]}{\Pr[C = \text{xy}]} \\ &= \frac{(1/26) \cdot 0.3}{(1/52)} = 0.6 \\ &\neq \Pr[M = \text{hi}] = 0.3\end{aligned}$$

Conclusion

- ▶ The Shift Cipher is not perfectly secret!
- ▶ How to construct a perfectly secret scheme?
- ▶ \implies next lecture!

End

Reference: From Chapter 2 until (included) Pag. 30 of the book.