



Examples of Reinforcement Learning Models applied to Computational Psychiatry:

Models of Substance Addiction

Peggy Seriès, IANC
Informatics, University of Edinburgh, UK

pseries@inf.ed.ac.uk

CCN Lecture 10

A New Model for Mental Illness

Mental illness is the result of an impairment in **prediction**, due to having a **distorted internal model** of the world, possibly due to an impairment in **learning**.



Applications of RL models to Computational Psychiatry


- RL models have been used to model almost all psychiatric disorders.
- **idea**: disorder can be understood as impairment in learning/decision-making.
- In the following 2 lectures, two examples:
 - Substance Addiction
 - Depression

- Nearly **23 million Americans—almost one in 10**—are addicted to alcohol or other drugs.
- More than two-thirds of people with addiction abuse **alcohol**.
- The top three drugs causing addiction are marijuana, opioid (narcotic) pain relievers, and cocaine.



Drug deaths in Scotland higher than other European countries



European countries with highest deaths per million aged 15-64, latest available data



Note: Scotland data to 2022. Other countries' data to 2021 unless marked:
*2017, **2018, †2020

Source: BMCCDA, National Records of Scotland

Substance Addiction: Diagnosis



Substance Addiction: Diagnosis

Person must demonstrate two of the following criteria within a 12-month period:

- regularly consuming **larger amounts of a substance than intended** or for a longer amount of time than planned
- often attempting to or expressing a **wish to moderate** the intake of a substance without reducing consumption
- spending long periods trying to get hold of a substance, use it, or recover from use
- **craving** the substance, or expressing a strong desire to use it
- **failing to fulfil** professional, educational, and family obligations
- regularly using a substance in spite of any social, emotional, or personal issues it may be causing or making worse
- giving up pastimes, passions, or social activities as a result of substance use
- consuming the substance in places or situations that could cause physical injury
- continuing to consume a substance despite being aware of any **physical or psychological harm** it is likely to have caused
- **increased tolerance**, meaning that a person must consume more of the substance to achieve intoxication
- **withdrawal symptoms**, or a physical response to not consuming the substance that is different for varying substances but might include sweating, shaking and nausea

> 2= mild; > 4=moderate; > 6=severe

Addiction

Controlled Drug Use



Loss of Behavioural Control




Systems involved: the Reward System

- Mesolimbic **Dopaminergic system** - increase of dopamine release
- DA system: originates in the **ventral tegmental area** (VTA) of the midbrain, and projects to the **nucleus accumbens** (NA - ventral striatum).
The amygdala (A), hippocampus (HC) and medial prefrontal cortex (PFC) send excitatory projections to the nucleus accumbens.
- Drug seeking behaviour induced by Glutamatergic projections from the prefrontal cortex to the NAc.

Table 1. Neurobiological Substrates for the Acute Reinforcing Effects of Drugs of Abuse

Drug of Abuse	Neurotransmitter	Sites
Cocaine and amphetamines	Dopamine	Nucleus accumbens
	Serotonin	Amygdala
Opiates	Dopamine	Ventral tegmental area
	Opioid peptides	Nucleus accumbens
Nicotine	Dopamine	Ventral tegmental area
	Opioid peptides?	Nucleus accumbens
		Amygdala?
THC	Dopamine	Ventral tegmental area
Ethanol	Opioid peptides?	
	Dopamine	Ventral tegmental area
	Opioid peptides	Nucleus accumbens
	Serotonin	Amygdala
	GABA	
	Glutamate	



Theories of Addiction

- In the past 30 years, lots of theories, e.g.
- **compulsion zone**: self administration is automatically induced when brain drug levels within a specific range.
- **set-point model (or allostasis)**: drugs decrease baseline level of reward sensitivity
- **opponent-process theory**: drug addiction = result of emotional pairing between pleasure and symptoms of withdrawal. Motivation is first related to pleasure, and then to relief from withdrawal.
- **impulsivity (discounting)**: Incapacity to consider long-term costs, prefer immediate rewards (drugs) over larger delayed rewards (e.g., long-term health).

→ **recently, addiction as a vulnerability in the decision process;**

Inspiration from **reinforcement learning**

TD learning -- 101

- World: **states**, **actions** and **rewards**;
actions are selected so as to maximize future rewards.
- States are associated with **value functions** defined as **expected future reward**

$$V(t) = \int_t^{\infty} \gamma^{\tau-t} E[R(\tau)] d\tau \quad (1)$$


- Goal of TD learning : correctly learn the values. To do this, iteratively use the difference between expected and observed change in value -- the **prediction error**:

$$\delta(t) = \gamma^d [R(S_t) + V(S_t)] - V(S_k) \quad (2)$$

- Value is then updated using:

$$V(S_k) \leftarrow V(S_k) + \eta_V \delta$$

- Once the value correctly predicts the reward, learning stops.
- a powerful learning algorithm in machine learning



Phasic dopamine signals prediction error

<http://www.sciencemag.org> • SCIENCE • VOL. 275 • 14 MARCH 1997


A Neural Substrate of Prediction and Reward

Wolfram Schultz, Peter Dayan, P. Read Montague*

The capacity to predict future events permits a creature to detect, model, and manipulate the causal structure of its interactions with its environment. Behavioral experiments suggest that learning is driven by changes in the expectations about future salient events such as rewards and punishments. Physiological work has recently complemented these studies by identifying dopaminergic neurons in the primate whose fluctuating output apparently signals changes or errors in the predictions of future salient and rewarding events. Taken together, these findings can be understood through quantitative theories of adaptive optimizing control.

- the “largest success of computational neuroscience” [Niv]

Phasic DA = Prediction Error





Addiction as a Computational Process Gone Awry

A. David Redish

Addictive drugs have been hypothesized to access the same neurophysiological mechanisms as natural learning systems. These natural learning systems can be modeled through temporal-difference reinforcement learning (TDRL), which requires a reward-error signal that has been hypothesized to be carried by dopamine. TDRL learns to predict reward by driving that reward-error signal to zero. By adding a noncompensable drug-induced dopamine increase to a TDRL model, a computational model of addiction is constructed that over-selects actions leading to drug receipt. The model provides an explanation for important aspects of the addiction literature and provides a theoretic viewpoint with which to address other aspects.




- Cocaine and other drugs produce a **transient increase in dopamine**
- idea: this dopamine surge induce an **increase in prediction error δ** that can't be compensated by changes in values

$$\delta = \max \{ \gamma^d [R(S_l) + V(S_l) - V(S_k) + D(S_l), D(S_l)] \}$$

where $D(S_l)$ indicates a dopamine surge occurring on entry into S_l .

Consequence: **values of states leading to the drug increase without bound.**

Redish's (Science, 2004) model



$$V(S_k) \leftarrow V(S_k) + \eta_V \delta$$

$$\delta = \max\{\gamma^d [R(S_l) + V(S_l)] - V(S_k) + D(S_l), D(S_l)\}$$

- **Drug is hijacking the learning pathways, creating a prediction error where there should be none.**

Redish's (2004) model




Fig. 3. Dopamine signals. **(Left)** With natural rewards, dopamine initially occurs primarily at reward receipt (on entry into reward state S_1) and shifts to the conditioned stimulus [on entry into interstimulus-interval (ISI) state S_0] with experience. (State space is shown in fig. S7.) **(Right)** With drugs that produce a dopamine signal neuropharmacologically, dopamine continues to occur at the drug receipt (on entry into reward state S_1) even after experience, as well as shifting to the conditioned stimulus (on entry into ISI state S_0), thus producing a double dopamine signal.

- Drug is hijacking the learning pathways, creating a prediction error where there should be none.

Redish's (2004) model: Predictions

- With repeated experience, drug choice becomes:
 - 1) **less sensitive to alternative non drug reinforcers** [some evidence];
 - 2) **more inelastic to costs** [confirmed]




Fig. 1. Probability of selecting a drug-receipt pathway depends on an interaction between drug level, experience, and contrasting reward. Each line shows the average probability of selecting the drug-receipt pathway, $S_0 \xrightarrow{a_2} S_2$, over the contrasting reward pathway, $S_0 \xrightarrow{a_1} S_1$, as a function of the size of the contrasting reward $R(S_3)$. (State space is shown in fig. S1.) Drug receipt on entering state S_4 was $R(S_4) = 1.0$ and $D(S_4) = 0.025$. Individual simulations are shown by dots. Additional details provided in (14).





Fig. 2. Elasticity of drug receipt and natural rewards. Both drug receipt and natural rewards are sensitive to costs, but natural rewards are more elastic. Each dot indicates the number of choices made within a session. Sessions were limited by simulated time. The curves have been normalized to the mean number of choices made at zero cost.

Redish's (2004) model: testing the predictions

- **Double surge of dopamine** in drug experiments
 - > validated but in different structures of the nucleus accumbens [Aragona et al 2009]
- Drugs would not show **Blocking** (when drugs are the reward)
 - [Panilio et al 2007, Jaffe et al 2014]
 - > a **subset of animals** don't show blocking with nicotine.



Redish's (2004) model: testing the predictions

- A lever delivers high dose of cocaine, then **reduced to lower dose** : Does the rat adapt how he values the lever (lower their reward expectation)?
- Redish's model predicts that he shouldn't.
 - > Theory not validated. But maybe a subset problem again?

Published in final edited form as:

Behav Brain Res. 2010 October 15; 212(2): 204–207. doi:10.1016/j.bbr.2010.03.053.


Learning That a Cocaine Reward is Smaller Than Expected: A Test of Redish's Computational Model of Addiction

Katherine R. Marks, David N. Kearns, Chesley J. Christensen, Alan Silberberg, and Stanley J. Weiss

Psychology Department American University

Abstract

The present experiment tested the prediction of Redish's [7] computational model of addiction that drug reward expectation continues to grow even when the received drug reward is smaller than expected. Initially, rats were trained to press two levers, each associated with a large dose of cocaine. Then, the dose associated with one of the levers was substantially reduced. Thus, when rats first pressed the reduced-dose lever, they expected a large cocaine reward, but received a small one. On subsequent choice tests, preference for the reduced-dose lever was reduced, demonstrating that rats learned to devalue the reduced-dose lever. The finding that rats learned to lower reward expectation when they received a smaller-than-expected cocaine reward is in opposition to the hypothesis that drug reinforcers produce a perpetual and non-correctable positive prediction error that causes the learned value of drug rewards to continually grow. Instead, the present results suggest that standard error-correction learning rules apply even to drug reinforcers.



Questions and extensions


- Redish's model, extensions and RL framework
--> a new generation of models and model-driven experiments.

Lots of remaining challenges:

- addiction to **ordinary rewards** such as fatty foods, which unlike cocaine produce a dopamine signal that can be accommodated
- addiction to **non-stimulant substances** which depend less on mesolimbic dopamine (e.g. alcohol)
- describing **withdrawal** symptoms -- opponent mechanisms
- why do people want to get **sober**?
- why do people **relapse**?; accounting for effect of **stress**.
- **vulnerability**: only a minority of people become addicted -- while other people can enjoy casual use, why? (drug use and drug addiction are two different things !).

Multi-systems theories: Model-based vs Model-Free

- TD learning models are called “model-free” because the structure of the environment is not learnt explicitly (i.e. transition prob., reward prob.)
- Debated how much human learning/ decision-making is “model-free” vs “model-based”
- model-based correspond to **planning, deliberative**
- model-free corresponds to **habit, inflexible, procedural**
- possibly relevant to **pathology**



Multi-systems theories: Model-based vs Model-Free

- It might be possible to execute the same task with one or the other of the systems.
- Damage to one system can drive behaviour to be controlled by the other
- There are multiple failure models in each system and interaction.
- Drug addiction could correspond to a **disruption of the model-based system and shift to model-free/ habitual system.**


habitual system



goal-directed system


Two-Steps Decision Task

- How can we assess the relative involvement of both systems in humans?
(Daw et al. 2011)
- On each trial, choosing between 2 stimuli leads with fixed probabilities to one of 2 pairs of stimuli in stage 2.
- Each of the four 2nd-stage stimuli is associated with a probabilistic outcome (money \$).
- Those probabilities change slowly and independently across the trials.




Two-Steps Decision Task

- Model-based and model-free strategies make different predictions about the influence of the outcome obtained after the second stage onto subsequent first-stage choices.




Two-Steps Decision Task

- Model-based and model-free strategies make different predictions about the influence of the outcome obtained after the second stage onto subsequent first-stage choices.




Two-Steps Decision Task

- Model-based and model-free strategies make different predictions about the influence of the outcome obtained after the second stage onto subsequent first-stage choices.



Two-Steps Decision Task


- Model-based and model-free strategies make different predictions about the influence of the outcome obtained after the second stage onto subsequent first-stage choices.



\$\$\$\$

Two-Steps Decision Task

- Model-based and model-free strategies make different predictions about the influence of the outcome obtained after the second stage onto subsequent first-stage choices.




habit system: increase value of choice that led to the action

\$\$\$\$

Two-Steps Decision Task


- Model-based and model-free strategies make different predictions about the influence of the outcome obtained after the second stage onto subsequent first-stage choices.



planning system: increase value of choice that is most likely to allow that action

Two-Steps Decision Task

- Model-based and model-free strategies make different predictions about the patterns of responses
- Comparison to those patterns and fitting models to participants responses can be used to quantify the contribution of each system in humans.



- Deficits in goal-directed decision-making have been linked to compulsive behaviour and intrusive thoughts (Gillian et al 2016).

Characterizing a psychiatric symptom dimension related to deficits in goal-directed control

Claire M Gillan^{1,2,3*}, Michal Kosinski⁴, Robert Whelan⁵, Elizabeth A Phelps^{1,6,7}, Nathaniel D Daw^{8,9}

¹Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, United States;

²Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom;

³Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom;

⁴Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom;

⁵Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom;

⁶Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom;

⁷Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom;

⁸Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom;

⁹Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom;

Neuropsychobiology

Neuropsychobiology 2014;70:122–131
DOI:10.1159/000362840

Received: October 2, 2013
Accepted after revision: April 10, 2014
Published online: October 30, 2014

Model-Based and Model-Free Decisions in Alcohol Dependence

Miriam Sebold^a, Lorenz Deserno^{a,c}, Stefan Nebe^a, Daniel J. Schadt^a,
Maria Garbusow^a, Claudia Hägele^a, Jürgen Keller^a, Elisabeth Jünger^a,
Norbert Kathmann^b, Michael Smolka^d, Michael A. Rapp^e,
Florian Schlagenhauf^{a,c}, Andreas Heinz^a, Quentin J.M. Huys^{a,h}

^aDepartment of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Campus Charité-Mitte, Charité-University Medicine Berlin, and

Conclusions

- Psychiatric disorders are increasingly viewed as **deficits in learning and decision-making**
- This makes **RL tasks and modelling relevant** to their study.
- Prominent models of **addiction** suggest that drug intake hijacks the learning processes (because dopamine surges interferes with the representation of prediction errors), hence leading to aberrant valuation of states leading to the drug.
- Decision-making depends on multiple systems acting concurrently. Drug addiction could correspond to a **disruption of the model-based system and shift to model-free/ habitual system.**