## Introduction to Modern Cryptography

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(Slides courtesy of Prof. Jonathan Katz)

Lecture 2 Part 1

# Vigenère Cipher

### The Vigenère cipher

- ► Key is a string, not a character
- ► Encrypt: shift each character in the plaintext by the amount dictated by the corresponding character of the key
- ► Wrap around in the key as needed
- ► Decryption just reverses the process

tellhimaboutme cafecafecafeca veqpjiredozxoe

## The Vigenère cipher

- ► Size of key space?
- ► Let key be 14-character English string
- ightharpoonup key space has size  $26^{14} \approx 2^{66}$
- ▶ Brute-force search infeasible
- ► Is the Vigenère cipher secure?
- ► (Believed secure for many years...)


## Attacking the Vigenère cipher

#### Observation

- ► Every **14**-th character is "encrypted" using the same shift
- ► Looking at every **14**-th character is (almost) like looking at ciphertext encrypted with the Shift Cipher
- ► (Direct brute-force attack still doesn't work)

[v]eqpjiredozxoe[u]alpcmsdjquiqn
[d]nossoscdcusoa[k]jqmxpqrhyycjq
[o]qqodhjcciowie[i]i

## Using plaintext letter frequencies



## Attacking the Vigenère cipher

- ► Look at every **14**-th character of the ciphertext, starting with the first call this a "stream"
- ightharpoonup Let lpha be the most common character appearing in this stream
- lacktriangleq Most likely  $m{lpha}$  corresponds to the most common plaintext character i.e.  $m{e}$
- ightharpoonup guess that the first character of the key is lpha-e
- ► Repeat for all other positions
- ▶ Require long ciphertext; prone to errors; can do better...

## A better attack 1/2

- ▶ Let  $p_i$ :  $0 \le i \le 25$  denote the frequency of the *i*-th English letter in normal English plaintext
- Compute  $\sum_{i} p_i^2 = 0.065$ : constant for English text
- ightharpoonup Let  $q_i$  denote the **observed** frequency of the *i*-th English letter within a given **ciphertext stream**
- $ightharpoonup (q_i \text{ is the number of times letter } i \text{ appears in the ciphertext stream divided by the stream length})$
- $lackbox{}{}i$  of  $q_i$  was obtained from letter i-j for key j
- lacktriangle Therefore  $q_i pprox p_{i-j}$  or equivalently  $q_{i+j} pprox p_i$

# A better attack 2/2

- ▶ So if the key for the stream is j, expect  $q_{i+j} \approx p_i, \forall i$
- ▶ So expect  $\sum_i p_i q_{i+j} \approx 0.065$  for the right key j
- ightharpoonup Test for every value of j to find the right one
- ► This recovers the first key character
- ► Repeat for the second stream to recover the second key character
- ► Repeat for all streams to recover the whole key
- ▶ Recall: # streams = # key characters

- ▶ The previous attack assumes we know the key length
- ▶ What if we don't?
- ► Of course, can always try the previous attack for all possible key lengths as long as: # key lengths ≪ # keys
- ► We can do better!

### Observation: correct key length

- ▶ For the **correct key length**, the ciphertext frequencies  $\{q_i\}$  of a stream will be shifted versions of the  $\{p_i\}$
- ▶ Recall that  $q_i \approx p_{i-j}$  (equivalently  $q_{i+j} \approx p_i$ ), where j is the key (the shift)
- ▶ In other words  $\{q_i\}$  is a permutation of  $\{p_i\}$
- ► It follows that:

$$\sum_{i} {q_i}^2 \approx \sum_{i} {p_i}^2 = 0.065$$

### Observation: incorrect key length

- ► When using an **incorrect key length**, expect (heuristically) that ciphertext letters are uniform
- ► For uniform distribution:

$$\sum_{i} {q_i}^2 = \sum_{i} (\frac{1}{26})^2 = 26(\frac{1}{26})^2 = \frac{1}{26} = 0.038$$

### Key length recovery

- ▶ For a cadidate key length, the attacker needs to distinguish between  $\sum_i q_i^2 = 0.065$  and  $\sum_i q_i^2 = 0.038$
- ▶ In fact, good enough to find the key length N that maximizes  $\sum_{i} q_i^2$
- ► (Can verify by looking at other streams)

Attack time?

### Time for determining the key length

- ▶ Let the key length be at most L i.e. 1 < N < L
- lacktriangledown Execute at most L trials for the correct key length
  - ▶ In each trial compute 26 frequencies  $q_i: 0 \le i < 26$
- ▶ Total time:  $\approx 26 L$

### Attack time?

### Time for determining the key

- ightharpoonup To deterime the *i*-th character of the key:
  - lacktriangle Execute 26 decryptions of the i-th stream for each candidate value B
    - ▶ In each decryption compute 26 frequencies  $q_i': 0 \le i \le 25$
- ▶ Total time to recover the *i*-th character:  $\approx 26^2$
- ▶ Total time to recover all key bytes:  $\leq 26^2 L$

#### Time for Brute-force

 $26^L$ 

Total attack time vs. brute-force

$$26L + 26^2L \approx 26^2L \ll 26^L$$

#### Note

- ► The attack is more reliable as the ciphertext length grows larger
- ► A Similar attack can be performed on byte-wise Vigenere

### Lessons learned

### Crypto Design Lesson One (recall)

► The key space must be large enough to make brute-force attacks impractical (cf. Shift Cipher)

### Crypto Design Lesson Two

▶ Large key space is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for a secure encryption scheme (cf. Vigenère Cipher)

But what does *secure* actually mean? (next lecture!)

### End

Reference: Section 1.3 of the book