Informatics 1 – Introduction to Computation Computation and Logic Julian Bradfield based on materials by Michael P. Fourman

More Syllogisms and more about syllogisms

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Reprise

So far, we have seen (and hopefully agreed on) these sound rules about predicates and \models :

•
$$\neg \neg a = a \text{ or } \frac{a}{\neg \neg a}$$
 (double negation)
• $\frac{a \models b \quad b \models c}{a \models c}$ (barbara)
• $\frac{a \models b}{\neg b \models \neg a}$ (contraposition)

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$$\frac{a \models b \quad b \models c}{a \models c} \text{ (barbara)}$$

$$\frac{a \models b}{\neg b \models \neg a} \text{ (contraposition)}$$

We also saw a 'different' (for Aristotle) syllogism with negatives got from *barbara* by putting $\neg c$ for c:

$a \models b b \models \neg c$	All snakes are reptiles
$\frac{a+b-b++c}{a \models \neg c}$	No reptile has fur
	∴ No snake has fur

More syllogisms

By using (un)negated predicates in *barbara*, we get 8 syllogisms:

$a \vDash b b \vDash c$	$\neg a \vDash b b \vDash c$
$a \vDash c$	$ eg a \vDash c$
$\frac{a \vDash b b \vDash \neg c}{a \vDash \neg c}$	$\frac{\neg a \vDash b b \vDash \neg c}{\neg a \vDash \neg c}$
$\frac{a \vDash \neg b \neg b \vDash c}{a \vDash c}$	$\frac{\neg a \vDash \neg b \neg b \vDash c}{\neg a \vDash c}$
$\frac{a \vDash \neg b \neg b \vDash \neg c}{a \vDash \neg c}$	$\frac{\neg a \vDash \neg b \neg b \vDash \neg c}{\neg a \vDash \neg c}$

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$a \vDash b b \vDash \neg c$	$\neg a \vDash b b \vDash \neg c$
$a \vDash \neg c$	$\neg a \vDash \neg c$
$\underline{a \vDash \neg b \neg b \vDash c}$	$\neg a \vDash \neg b \neg b \vDash c$
$a \vDash c$	$\neg a \vDash c$
$a \vDash \neg b \neg b \vDash \neg c$	$\neg a \vDash \neg b \neg b \vDash \neg c$
$a \models \neg c$	$\neg a \vDash \neg c$

Aristotle only considered negative predicates on the right of \vDash $(a \vDash \neg b \text{ means 'no } a \text{ is } b', \text{ so he viewed it as a negative statement about positive predicates}). This leaves ...$

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barbara and celarent

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
Even more syllogisms

Contraposition lets us generate three more (Aristotelian) syllogisms from *celarent*:

$$\frac{a \models b \quad c \models \neg b}{a \models \neg c} \qquad \frac{a \models b \quad b \models \neg c}{c \models \neg a} \qquad \frac{a \models b \quad c \models \neg b}{c \models \neg a}$$


cesare,camenes, camestres

That brings us to 5 sound universal syllogisms. That's all!




$$\frac{a \vDash b \quad b \vDash \neg c}{a \vDash c}$$

All snakes are reptiles No reptile has fur ∴ All snakes have fur




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
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$$\begin{array}{c}
a \models b \quad b \models \neg c \\
\times \quad & \times \\ a \models c
\end{array}$$

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


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All snakes are reptiles No reptile has fur ∴ All snakes have fur To disprove a syllogism, we need just one universe where it's invalid (e.g. Edinburgh zoo).

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$$\overset{a\models b}{\times} \overset{b\models \neg c}{\overset{a\models c}{\times}} \overset{a\models c}{\overset{}{\times}} \overset{a\models c}{\overset{}{\times}}$$

All snakes are reptiles No reptile has fur ∴ All snakes have fur To disprove a syllogism, we need just one universe where it's invalid (e.g. Edinburgh zoo).

Is there a universe where this syllogism *is* valid?

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(Aristotle said 'no'; we moderns differ. Hint: St Patrick.)

Five sound universal syllogisms

From *barbara*, contraposition, and double negation, we have five sound syllogisms about universal statements:

$\frac{a \vDash b b \vDash c}{a \vDash c}$		
$\frac{a \vDash b b \vDash \neg c}{a \vDash \neg c}$		
$\frac{a \vDash b c \vDash \neg b}{a \vDash \neg c}$		
$\frac{a \vDash b b \vDash \neg c}{c \vDash \neg a}$	equivalently	$\frac{c \vDash b b \vDash \neg a}{a \vDash \neg c}$
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$\frac{a \models b b \models c}{a \models c}$ $\frac{a \models b b \models \neg c}{a \models \neg c}$	Note that the conclusion is negative iff exactly one of the premises is negative – compare the unsound syllogism on the previous slide.
$a \models \neg c$ $\frac{a \models b c \models \neg b}{a \models \neg c}$	
$\frac{a \models b b \models \neg c}{c \models \neg a} \text{equivalently}$	$c \models b b \models \neg a$ $a \models \neg c$
$\frac{a \vDash b c \vDash \neg b}{c \vDash \neg a} \text{equivalently}$	$\frac{c \models b a \models \neg b}{a \models \neg c}$

Reprise

From the fundamental rule barbara

$$\frac{a \vDash b \quad b \vDash c}{a \vDash c}$$

together with *contraposition* and *double negation*, we got five sound femi syllogisms about *universal categorical statements*.

Contraposition is negating and swapping the two parts of a sequent:

$$a \vDash b \longrightarrow \neg b \vDash \neg a$$

Barbara is the feminine form of the Greek $\beta \dot{\alpha} \rho \beta \alpha \rho o \varsigma$ (barbaros) 'foreign'. Taken into Latin, it was used as the name of a mythical early Christian martyr, daughter of a pagan (barbarian).

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In England you can buy alcohol at any time. In some countries you can't buy it (legally) at all.

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> In Scotland Time between 10h and 22h Can legally buy alcohol

In England you can buy alcohol at any time. In some countries you can't buy it (legally) at all.

The predicates have an implicit argument combining an adult, a time, and a place. This rule is not *sound*, it just holds in some universes – it's a rule of law, not logic!

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What other rules can we infer from this?

In Scotland Cannot legally buy alcohol ???

Time between 10h and 22h Can**not** legally buy alcohol

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Sequents are themselves propositions. Applying the same principle, from

$$\frac{a\models b \quad b\models c}{a\models c}$$

we get

$$\frac{a \vDash b \quad a \nvDash c}{b \nvDash c} \qquad \frac{b \vDash c \quad a \nvDash c}{a \nvDash b}$$

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
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
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
$$\frac{a \models b \quad a \nvDash c}{b \nvDash c} \qquad \frac{b \models c \quad a \nvDash c}{a \nvDash b}$$
Why does contraposition work between the conclusion and *one* premise at a time?
What is the relation between the two premises?
Can we combine them into one?
What is the difference between $a \models b$ and $a \rightarrow b$?
These two syllogisms are *bocardo* and *baroco*.

(not exactly) Aristotle's categorical propositions



particular negative

(not exactly) Aristotle's categorical propositions



particular affirmative

some a is not b particular negative Why not exactly?

Aristotle made the *existential assumption*: if you say 'all *a* are *b*', or 'no *a* is *b*', that means that some *a* exists. So for him, universal affirmative implies particular affirmative, and universal negative implies particular negative.


This syllogism comes from *barbara* via contrapositions (do that!), so it should be sound. Check with Venn diagrams:

$$\frac{c \vDash \neg b \quad a \nvDash \neg c}{a \nvDash b}$$

No mathematician is infallible Some programmers are mathematicians .:. Some programmers are fallible

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


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


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



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
What about this one?






All plants are fungi Some flowers are not plants ∴ Some flowers are not fungi


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
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
$\frac{a \vDash b \quad c \nvDash a}{c \nvDash b}$

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What about this one?



Suppose a *quonce* is a fungus flower, but not a plant, and nothing else exists. This disproves the syllogism.



All plants are fungi Some flowers are not plants ∴ Some flowers are not fungi In the usual meanings, no plant is a fungus, and all flowers are plants. That doesn't matter: the argument doesn't depend on the truth or falsity of the premises in a particular universe.

Deriving rules

We have used the following to derive sound rules from *barbara*:

- ▶ substitution (e.g. q for a, $\neg b$ for b)
- ▶ double negation cancellation $(\neg \neg a \longrightarrow a)$
- contraposition within sequents $(a \vDash b \longrightarrow \neg b \vDash \neg a)$
- contraposition between conclusion and a premise

$$\frac{a \vDash b \quad b \vDash c}{a \vDash c} \longrightarrow \frac{a \vDash b \quad a \nvDash c}{b \nvDash c}$$

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Because these processes are symmetrical, they also derive unsound rules from unsound rules.

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All the sound syllogisms

$a \vDash b b \vDash c$	<u>a⊨b a⊭c</u>	$b \vDash c a \nvDash c$
$a \vDash c$	$b \nvDash c$	a⊭ b
$\frac{a \vDash b \qquad b \vDash \neg c}{a \vDash \neg c}$	$\frac{a \vDash b a \nvDash \neg c}{b \nvDash \neg c}$	$\frac{b \vDash \neg c a \nvDash \neg c}{a \nvDash b}$
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	$\frac{a \vDash \neg b \qquad a \nvDash \neg c}{c \nvDash b}$	$\frac{b \vDash \neg c c \nvDash \neg a}{a \nvDash b}$
	$\frac{a \vDash b \qquad c \nvDash \neg a}{c \nvDash \neg b}$	$\frac{c \vDash b a \nvDash \neg c}{b \nvDash \neg a}$

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All the sound syllogisms

$\frac{a \vDash b \qquad b \vDash c}{a \vDash c}$	$\frac{a \vDash b a \nvDash c}{b \nvDash c}$	$\frac{b \vDash c a \nvDash c}{a \nvDash b}$
$\frac{a \vDash b b \vDash \neg c}{a \vDash \neg c}$	$\frac{a \vDash b \qquad a \nvDash \neg c}{b \nvDash \neg c}$	$\frac{b \models \neg c a \nvDash \neg c}{a \nvDash b}$
$\frac{a \vDash b c \vDash \neg b}{a \vDash \neg c}$	$\frac{a \vDash b \qquad a \nvDash \neg c}{c \nvDash \neg b}$	$\frac{c \vDash \neg b a \nvDash \neg c}{a \nvDash b}$
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	$\frac{a \vDash b \qquad c \nvDash \neg a}{c \nvDash \neg b}$	$\frac{c \vDash b a \nvDash \neg c}{b \nvDash \neg a}$

You can derive all these. Mediaeval students learned them, with the help of this verse:

Barbara celarent darii ferio baralipton Celantes dabitis fapesmo frisesomorum Cesare camestres festino baroco Darapti felapton disamis datisi bocardo ferison

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- A syllogism takes two premise categorical propositions and derives a conclusion categorical proposition.
- ▶ We can check syllogisms for *soundness* with Venn diagrams.
- > All sound syllogisms come from *barbara* via contraposition etc.

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It's all much murkier than this. This existential assumption contradicts other aspects of Aristotle's system. In short, he was most likely confused. D. W. Mulder, The existential assumptions of traditional logic, *Hist. & Phil. Logic*, 17:1-2,

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