

Informatics 2D: Reasoning and Agents

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Lecture 20: Acting under Uncertainty

Where are we?

Last time ...

- Previous part of course discussed planning as an efficient way of determining actions that will achieve goals
- Used more elaborate representations than in search, but avoided full complexity of logical reasoning
- Allowed uncertainty to some extent (e.g. conditional planning, replanning)
- However the approaches seen so far don't allow for a *quantification* of uncertainty

Today ...

- **Acting under uncertainty**

Handling uncertain knowledge

- So far we have always assumed that propositions are assumed to be true, false, or unknown
- But in reality, we have hunches rather than complete ignorance or absolute knowledge
- Approaches like conditional planning and replanning handle things that might go wrong
- But they don't tell us how likely it is that something might go wrong. . .
- And **rational decisions** (i.e. 'the right thing to do') depend on the relative importance of various goals and the **likelihood** that (and degree to which) they will be achieved

Handling uncertain knowledge

- To develop theories of uncertain reasoning we must look at the nature of uncertain knowledge
- Example: rules for dental diagnosis
 - A rule like $\forall p \text{ Symptom}(p, \text{Toothache}) \Rightarrow \text{Disease}(p, \text{Cavity})$ is clearly wrong
 - Disjunctive conclusions require long lists of potential diagnoses:

$$\forall p \text{ Symptom}(p, \text{Toothache}) \Rightarrow$$

$$\text{Disease}(p, \text{Cavity}) \vee \text{Disease}(p, \text{GumDisease}) \vee \text{Disease}(p, \text{Abscess}) \dots$$

- Causal rules like $\forall p \text{ Disease}(p, \text{Cavity}) \Rightarrow \text{Symptom}(p, \text{Toothache})$ can also cause problems
- Even if we know all possible causes, what if the cavity and the toothache are not connected?

Uncertain knowledge, logic, and probabilities

- Clearly, using (classical) logic is not very useful to capture uncertainty, because of ...
 - complexity (can be impractical to include all antecedents and consequents in rules, and/or too hard to use them)
 - theoretical ignorance (don't know a rule completely)
 - practical ignorance (don't know the current state)
 - How *likely* an unknown factor is influences how we reason and act
- One possible approach: express **degrees of belief** in propositions using **probability theory**
Probability can summarise the uncertainty that comes from our 'laziness' and ignorance
- Probabilities between 0 and 1 express the degree to which we believe a proposition to be true

Degrees of belief and probabilities

- In probability theory, propositions themselves are actually true or false!
- **Degrees of truth** are the subject of other methods (like **fuzzy logic**) not dealt with here
- Degrees of belief depend on **evidence** and should change with new evidence
- Don't confuse this with change in the world that might make the proposition itself true or false!
- Before evidence is obtained we speak of **prior/unconditional probability**, after evidence of **posterior probability**

Uncertainty and rational decisions

- Logical agent has a goal and executes any plan guaranteed to achieve it
- Different with degrees of belief: If plan P has a 90% chance of success, how about another P' with a higher probability? Or how about P'' with higher cost but same probability?
- Agent must have **preferences** over **outcomes** of plans
- **Utility theory** can be used to reason about those preferences
- Based on idea that every state has a degree of usefulness and agents prefer states with higher utility
- Utilities vary from one agent to another.

Decision theory

- A general theory of rational decision making
- **Decision theory** = probability theory + utility theory
- Foundation of decision theory:
 - An agent is rational if and only if it chooses the action that yields the highest expected utility, averaged over all possible outcomes of the action*
- Principle of **Maximum Expected Utility**
- Although we follow it here, some points of criticism:
 - Knowledge of preferences?
 - Consistency of preferences?
 - Risk-taking attitude?



Are We Rational?

A: 100% chance of £3000 C: 25% chance of £3000
B: 80% chance of £4000 D: 20% chance of £4000

- 84% of you chose lottery A over lottery B.
- 77% of you chose lottery D over lottery C.
- So lots of you chose A and D, which is **irrational!**
 - If $U(3000) > 0.8 * U(4000)$, then
 $0.25 * U(3000) > 0.2 * U(4000)$!!
- Our ability to MEU also affected by emotion, social relationships, relationships among our choices. . .
- In fact, we're **predictably irrational**.
- If we were always rational, we wouldn't have self-help, life coaches etc.

Utility of money (empirical study)

- For most people concave curve (a), showing that going into debt is considered disastrous relative to small gains in money—**risk averse**.



- But if you're already \$10M in debt, your utility curve is more like (b)—**risk seeking** when desperate!

Design for a decision-theoretic agent

- For the time being, we will focus on probability and not utility.
- But still useful to have an idea of general abstract design for a decision-theoretic (utility-based) agent
- Characterised by basic perception-action loop as follows:
 - 1 Update belief state based on previous action and percept
 - 2 Calculate outcome probabilities for actions given action descriptions and belief states
 - 3 Select action with highest expected utility given probabilities of outcomes and utility information
- Very simple but broadly accepted as a general principle for building agents able to cope with real-world environments

Propositions & atomic events

- Degrees of belief concern propositions
- Basic notion: **random variable**, a part of the world whose status is unknown, with a **domain** (e.g. *Cavity* with domain $\langle true, false \rangle$)
- Can be boolean, discrete or continuous
- Can compose complex propositions from statements about random variables (e.g. $Cavity = true \wedge Toothache = false$)
- **Atomic event** = complete specification of the state of the world
 - Atomic events are mutually exclusive
 - Their set is exhaustive
 - Every event entails truth or falsehood of any proposition (like models in logic)
 - Every proposition logically equivalent to the disjunction of all atomic events that entail it

Propositions & atomic events

- **Unconditional/prior probability** = degree of belief in a proposition a in the absence of any other information
- Can be between 0 and 1, write as $P(\text{Cavity} = \text{true}) = 0.1$ or $P(\text{cavity}) = 0.1$
- **Probability distribution** = the probabilities of all values of a random variable
- Write $P(\text{Weather}) = \langle 0.7, 0.2, 0.1 \rangle$ for

$$P(\text{Weather} = \text{sunny}) = 0.7$$

$$P(\text{Weather} = \text{rain}) = 0.2$$

$$P(\text{Weather} = \text{cloudy}) = 0.1$$

Probability distributions/conditional probabilities

- For a mixture of several variables, we obtain a **joint probability distribution** (JPD) – cross-product of individual distributions
- A JPD (“joint”) describes one’s uncertainty about the world as it specifies the probability of every atomic event
- For continuous variables we use **probability density function** (we cannot enumerate values)
- Will talk about these in detail later
- **Conditional probability** $P(a|b)$ = the probability of a given that all we know is b
- Example: $P(\text{cavity}|\text{toothache}) = 0.8$ means that if patient is observed to have toothache, then there is an 80% chance that he has a cavity

Conditional probabilities

- Can be defined using unconditional probabilities:

$$P(a|b) = \frac{P(a \wedge b)}{P(b)}$$

- Often written as **product rule** $P(a \wedge b) = P(a|b)P(b)$
- Good for describing JPDs (which then become “CPDs”) as $P(X, Y) = P(X|Y)P(Y)$
- Set of equations, not matrix multiplication (!):

$$P(X = x_1 \wedge Y = y_1) = P(X = x_1|Y = y_1)P(Y = y_1)$$

$$P(X = x_1 \wedge Y = y_2) = P(X = x_1|Y = y_2)P(Y = y_2)$$

⋮

$$P(X = x_n \wedge Y = y_m) = P(X = x_n|Y = y_m)P(Y = y_m)$$

- Conditional probability does **not** mean logical implication!

The axioms of probability

- Kolmogorov's axioms define basic semantics for probabilities:

1. $0 \leq P(a) \leq 1$ for any proposition a
2. $P(\text{true}) = 1$ and $P(\text{false}) = 0$
3. $P(a \vee b) = P(a) + P(b) - P(a \wedge b)$

- From this, a number of useful facts can be derived, e.g:

- $P(\neg a) = 1 - P(a)$
- For variable D with domain $\langle d_1, \dots, d_n \rangle$, $\sum_{i=1}^n P(D = d_i) = 1$
- And so any JPD over finite variables sums to 1
- If $e(a)$ is the set of atomic events that entail a , then (because they are mutually exclusive) it holds that

$$P(a) = \sum_{e_i \in e(a)} P(e_i)$$

- With this, we can calculate the probability of any proposition from a JPD

Example derivation: $P(\neg a) = 1 - P(a)$

$$\begin{aligned} P(\neg a \vee a) &= P(\text{true}) && \text{logic} \\ &= 1 && \text{axiom1} \\ &= P(\neg a) + P(a) - P(\neg a \wedge a) && \text{axiom3} \\ &= P(\neg a) + P(a) - P(\text{false}) && \text{logic} \\ &= P(\neg a) + P(a) - 0 && \text{axiom1} \\ &= P(\neg a) + P(a) && \text{arithmetic} \\ P(\neg a) &= 1 - P(a) && \text{arithmetic} \end{aligned}$$

Summary

- Explained why logic in itself is insufficient to model uncertainty
- Discussed principles of decision making under uncertainty
 - Decision theory, MEU principle
- Probability theory provides useful tools for quantifying degree of belief/uncertainty in propositions
- Atomic events, propositions, random variables
- Probability distributions, conditional probabilities
- Axioms of probability
- Next time: **Introduction to Coursework 2**