Introduction to Quantum Computing Lecture 25: Universal Blind Quantum Computing

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This Lecture

- Blind Quantum Computing: What & Why
- 2 Tools for MBQC-based Universal Blind Quantum Computing
- 3 UBQC protocol and Verification

Part I


Blind Quantum Computing: What & Why

Secure Cloud Computing

Modern Cyber Security goes beyond encryption

(e.g. Privacy-preserving Data Mining)

Delegated Private Computation (e.g. sensitive medical data)




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Verified Delegated Private Computation




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
(e.g. Privacy-preserving Data Mining)

Secure Multiparty Computation (e.g. e-voting, auctions)





- Clients wants to maintain privacy, accuracy and reliability
- Clients wants to use the extra power of quantum computing




- Universal Blind Quantum Computation (Broadbent, Fitzsimons, Kashefi 2009)
- Basis for numerous extra functionalities
- Client sends random single qubits to Server




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Verifiable Secure Quantum Cloud











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Secure Two-Party Quantum Computation



Part II

Tools for MBQC-based Universal Blind Quantum Computing

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Blind Computation ⇒ Bob cannot determine Alice's:

- Input
- Intended output
- Computation (not required for fully homomorphic encryption)

Alice must encrypt everything (input, computation, output)



General Idea

- Use of MBQC (possible otherwise)
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
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 - ② Instructs Bob to entangle them (∧Z) as in a cluster state for MBQC and then measure them after further interaction
- Bob:
 - 1 Does **not** know what states Alice sends him
 - Follows instructions; returns measurement outcomes to Alice

Blindness w.r.t. the "true" default angles $\{\phi_i\}_i$ and the shape of the "true" resource $|G\rangle$



Universal Blind Quantum Computation (UBQC)

Keep x and f(x) hidden from server






Server


Client ∈ BPP

Server \in BQP

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Properties:

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$$R(\theta_1)R(\theta_2) = R(\theta_1 + \theta_2) = R(\theta_2)R(\theta_1)$$
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(c) $M^{\alpha} = M^{Z}HR(-\alpha)$.

Measuring at an angle is equivalent with applying the inverse circuit that prepares $|\pm_{\alpha}\rangle$ and then measure in comp. basis.

Consider Two Scenarios:

• Scenario 1 (normal MBQC)

$$M_{1}^{\phi} \wedge Z_{12} \ket{+}_{1} \ket{+}_{2} \rightarrow \ket{s_{1}}_{1} X^{s_{1}} J(-\phi) \ket{+}_{2} = \ket{s_{1}}_{1} X^{s_{1}} HR(-\phi) \ket{+}_{2}$$

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- Two scenarios have same effect
- If θ is unknown to Bob, when he measures $(\phi + \theta)$ he is ignorant of the "true" angle of the J-gate he implements.

Trick 2: Hiding the measurement outcome

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• **Scenario 2** (outcome hidden by $r \leftarrow \{0,1\}$)

$$\begin{split} &M_{1}^{\phi+r\pi} \wedge Z_{12} \left| + \right\rangle_{1} \left| + \right\rangle_{2} \rightarrow \left| b_{1} \right\rangle_{1} X^{b_{1}} J(-\phi - r\pi) \left| + \right\rangle_{2} \\ &|b_{1} \rangle_{1} X^{b_{1}} HR(-r\pi) R(-\phi) \left| + \right\rangle_{2} = \left| b_{1} \right\rangle_{1} X^{b_{1}} HZ^{r} R(-\phi) \left| + \right\rangle_{2} \\ &|b_{1} \rangle_{1} X^{b_{1}+r} HR(-\phi) \left| + \right\rangle_{2} = \left| b_{1} \right\rangle_{1} X^{s_{1}} HR(-\phi) \left| + \right\rangle_{2} \\ &\text{where } s_{1} := b_{1} + r \end{split}$$

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- Two scenarios have **same** effect on qubit 2
- If Bob doesn't know r, when he measures $\phi + r\pi$ he is ignorant of the "true" measurement outcome s_1 and how to correct in the future angles.



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- Define angle:

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- Measuring ϕ_i' angle on state $|+\rangle$ is the same as measuring $\phi_i' + \theta_i$ angle on state $|+_{\theta_i}\rangle$
- Adding $r_i\pi$ does **not** change the measurement, only flips the outcome ($s_i = 0$ goes to $s_i = 1$ and visa-versa)



Summary of Instructions

- ullet Alice sends $|+_{ heta_i}
 angle$ and instructs Bob to measure in δ_i
- Bob returns outcome b_i
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The pre-rotation θ_i one-time-pads the true measurement angle ϕ_i' , and r_i one-time-pads the true measurement outcome s_i

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Note: Interaction is required so that Alice can compute the corrected measurement angle ϕ'_i which depends on the (corrected) measurement outcomes (and thus cannot be computed by Bob).

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Solution:

- A general graph (e.g. 2-dim lattice) where the actual graph used can be embedded
- A trick to "break" the graph at a vertex (remove vertex and break connectivity of the graph)

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Solution:

- A general graph (e.g. 2-dim lattice) where the actual graph used can be embedded
- A trick to "break" the graph at a vertex (remove vertex and break connectivity of the graph)
- Alternatively, could consider certain graph states that are universal with only $|\pm_{\phi}\rangle$ measurements (e.g. "brickwork state)

• $\wedge Z_{12} |0\rangle_1 |\psi\rangle_2 = |0\rangle_1 |\psi\rangle_2$; $\wedge Z_{12} |1\rangle_1 |\psi\rangle_2 = |1\rangle_1 (Z |\psi\rangle_2)$ Computational basis qubits do **not** get entangled with $\wedge Z$ $\wedge Z_{12} |d\rangle_1 |\psi\rangle_2 = |d\rangle_1 (Z^d |\psi\rangle_2)$

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• Scenario 1: Alice sends randomly $\{|+\rangle\,, |-\rangle\}$ state, with equal probability

Bob's view:
$$\rho = \frac{1}{2} \left(|+\rangle \langle +|+|-\rangle \langle -| \right) = \frac{1}{2} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

• Scenario 2: Alice sends randomly $\{|0\rangle, |1\rangle\}$ state, with equal probability

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- Bob cannot distinguish the positions that the graph breaks from other positions, thus he is ignorant of the "true" shape of the resource used
- The dummy qubits produce a Z^d correction to all neighbouring qubits.

These corrections are:

(i) known to Alice only, (ii) know from the start

Alice takes them into account when computing the angle that she asks Bob to measure

(Adds $d\pi$ to the angle of qubits neighbouring with $|d\rangle$ qubit)



Part III

UBQC protocol and Verification of Quantum Computing

A first UBQC protocol

We assume only M^{α} measurements (breaking to the desired resource state happens as described)

We assume classical input/output (can generalise)

Input:

- Graph G of m qubits sufficient for given computation
- m "default" measurement angles ϕ_i performing desired computation
- m random variables $\theta_i \leftarrow \{0, \pi/4, \cdots, 7\pi/4\}$, m random variables $r_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ chosen secretly by Alice

Initial Step:


- Alice sends to Bob m qubits of the form $|+_{\theta_i}\rangle$
- Bob applies $\land Z_{ij}$ according to the graph and generates the "secretly rotated" resource state



A first UBQC protocol

Step i: $1 \le i \le m$

- Alice computes the angle $\delta_i = \phi_i' + \theta_i + r_i \pi$ and instruct Bob to measure qubit i at this angle
- Bob measures qubit i and returns outcome b_i to Alice
- Alice sets the value $s_i = b_i \oplus r_i$
- Alice moves to step i + 1 until i = m where the protocol terminates
- The outcome is obtained from the last "layer" of measurements



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
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
Alice knows this result in advance, but Bod doesn't
 (Bob neither knows the d's nor the position that a trap exists)



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
• The trap qubit (after $\land Z$ -gates) is at state:

$$Z^{d_1+d_3+d_4} |+_{\pi/4}\rangle = Z^2 |+_{\pi/4}\rangle = |+_{\pi/4}\rangle$$

• If measured in the $\{\ket{+_{\pi/4}},\ket{-_{\pi/4}}\}$ -basis we get (always) $b_2=0$



- Position of traps and dummies is unknown to Bob
- Result of measurement of trap, if measured in M_t^{θ} -basis is deterministic and known in advance to Alice
- If Bob deviates at the protocol, he may deviate on the trap qubit and this will be detected by Alice!



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Method to verify/test any quantum computation device



References

Blind Quantum Computation

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Verifiable Blind Quantum Computation

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