



THE UNIVERSITY  
*of* EDINBURGH

# Methods for Causal Inference

## Lecture 5: Rubin's framework, propensity score, IPTW

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# Potential Outcomes: Assumptions


- **SUTVA:** Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption
  - **Consistency:** Well-defined treatment (no different versions) potential outcome is independent of how the treatment is assigned
  - **No interference:** Different individuals (units) within a population do not influence each other (e.g. does not work in social behavioural studies, care must be taken for time series data when defining the units)

# Potential Outcomes: Assumptions

- **SUTVA: Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption**
  - **Consistency:** Well-defined treatment (no different versions) potential outcome is independent of how the treatment is assigned
  - **No interference:** Different individuals (units) within a population do not influence each other (e.g. does not work in social behavioural studies, care must be taken for time series data when defining the units)
- **Positivity:** Every individual has a non-zero chance of receiving the treatment/control:
$$p(t = 1|x) \in (0, 1) \text{ if } P(x) > 0$$
- **Unconfoundedness (ignorability/exchangeability):** Treatment assignment is random, given confounding features  $X$

# Observational data: What goes wrong?

$$p(x|t = 1) \neq p(x|t = 0)$$



$$\left( \int y_1(x)p(x|t = 1)dx - \int y_0(x)p(x|t = 0)dx \right) \neq \int (y_1(x) - y_0(x))p(x)dx$$


# Adjustment formula (will be revisited later)

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_1 - Y_0 | X] = \mathbb{E}[Y_1 | X] - \mathbb{E}[Y_0 | X]$$

$$= \mathbb{E}[Y_1 | T = 1, X] - \mathbb{E}[Y_0 | T = 0, X] \quad \text{By Unconfoundedness: } Y_1, Y_0 \perp\!\!\!\perp T \mid X$$

$$= \mathbb{E}[Y | T = 1, X] - \mathbb{E}[Y | T = 0, X] \quad \text{By construction: } Y = TY_1 + (1 - T)Y_0$$

Also need positivity




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Also need positivity

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}[Y_1 - Y_0] &= \mathbb{E}_X \left[ \mathbb{E}[Y_1 - Y_0|X] \right] \\ \boxed{\text{ATE}} \quad &= \mathbb{E}_X \left[ \mathbb{E}[Y|T = 1, X] - \mathbb{E}[Y|T = 0, X] \right] \quad \boxed{\text{The adjustment formula}}\end{aligned}$$



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
$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}[Y_1 - Y_0] &= \mathbb{E}_X \left[ \mathbb{E}[Y_1 - Y_0|X] \right] \\ &= \mathbb{E}_X \left[ \underbrace{\mathbb{E}[Y|T = 1, X] - \mathbb{E}[Y|T = 0, X]}_{\text{The adjustment formula}} \right]\end{aligned}$$

Hypothetical world

Real world

i.e., can be estimated from observational data

Causal identifiability



# Regression Adjustment: Another perspective

Fit a model for  $Q(T, X) = \mathbb{E}[Y|T, X]$

(last time we substituted  $T=1$  and  $T=0$  into individual treatment effect  $= Q(1, x^{(i)}) - Q(0, x^{(i)})$ , then took average over all individuals  $i$ , via linear regression). Under the linearity assumption:

$$\mathbb{E}[Y|T, X] = \alpha_0 + \beta_x X + \beta_t T + \epsilon, \quad \mathbb{E}[\epsilon] = 0$$



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
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$$\begin{aligned} ATE &= \mathbb{E}_X \left[ \mathbb{E}[Y|T = 1, X] - \mathbb{E}[Y|T = 0, X] \right] \\ &= \left( \alpha_0 + \beta_x \mathbb{E}[X] + \beta_t \right) - \left( \alpha_0 + \beta_x \mathbb{E}[X] \right) \\ &= \beta_t \end{aligned}$$

# Important remarks about the previous form:

- 1) Depends on the structure of the causal graph of interest
- 2) Data need not be linear  
model-misspecification -> statistical bias



# Important remarks about the previous form:

2) Data need not be linear, example:

Say we fitted  $\mathbb{E}[Y|T, X] = \alpha_0 + \beta_x X + \beta_t T + \epsilon$  ,  $\mathbb{E}[\epsilon] = 0$

And obtained  $\beta_t$  for the causal effect,

BUT, in reality the true data generating distribution is e.g.

$$\mathbb{E}[Y|T, X] = \alpha_0 + \beta_x X + \beta_t T + \gamma X.T + \epsilon , \mathbb{E}[\epsilon] = 0$$

Or e.g. non-linear:

$$\mathbb{E}[Y|T, X] = e^{\alpha_0 + \beta_x X + \beta_t T + \gamma X.T}$$



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
Then  $ATE = \mathbb{E}_X \left[ \mathbb{E}[Y|T = 1, X] - \mathbb{E}[Y|T = 0, X] \right]$   
is **not** simply  $\beta_t$  !!

Valid causal inference requires correctly-specified models and mathematical guarantees!



# Overview of the course

- **Lecture 1:** Introduction & Motivation, why do we care about causality?  
Why deriving causality from observational data is non-trivial.
- **Lecture 2:** Recap of probability theory, variables, events, conditional probabilities, independence, law of total probability, Bayes' rule
- **Lecture 3:** Recap of regression, multiple regression, graphs, SCM
- **Lecture 4-20:**




# Matching

**Idea:** Create a 'clone/twin' for each individual (in terms of X)  
i.e. if individual 1 has  $t = 1$ , then their 'clone/twin' has  $t = 0$ .

Blind ourselves to the outcomes, try to get as similar to a randomised experiment as possible ('correct for confounding')

Example:



# Balancing Score

- In a perfect **randomised** trial:  $p(t=1|x)=p(t=1)$
- In an **observational study**,  $p(t=1|x)$  can be **estimated**, since it involves **observational data** at a  $t$  and  $x$  (hence identifiable).

- A **balancing score** is any function  $b(x)$  such that:

$$x \perp\!\!\!\perp t | b(x)$$

- i.e., distribution of confounders is independent of treatment given  $b(x)$ :

$$p(X = x | b(x), t = 1) = p(X = x | b(x), t = 0)$$

# Balancing Score: Proof 1

**Unconfoundedness given a balancing score.** Suppose we have unconfoundedness, i.e.,  $Y_1^{(i)}, Y_0^{(i)} \perp\!\!\!\perp T^{(i)} \mid X^{(i)}$ . Then for a balancing score  $b(x)$  we have:

$$Y_1^{(i)}, Y_0^{(i)} \perp\!\!\!\perp T^{(i)} \mid b(X^{(i)})$$



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$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}_W[\mathbb{E}_{Z|W}[Z|W]] &= \sum_w \sum_z p(Z = z \mid W = w) \cdot z \cdot p(W = w) \\ &= \sum_{w,z} \frac{p(z, w)}{p(w)} \cdot z \cdot p(w) = \sum_z p(z) \cdot z = \mathbb{E}_Z[Z]\end{aligned}$$

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$$p_T(T = 1 \mid Y_1, Y_0, b(X)) = \mathbb{E}_T[T \mid Y_1, Y_0, b(X)]$$

$$= \mathbb{E}_{X \mid Y_1, Y_0, b(X)} \left[ \mathbb{E}[T \mid Y_1, Y_0, b(X), X] \mid Y_1, Y_0, b(X) \right]$$

$$\mathbb{E}[Z \mid W] = \mathbb{E}_{V \mid W}[\mathbb{E}[Z \mid W, V] \mid W]$$

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By definition of balancing score:  
 $X \perp\!\!\!\perp T \mid b(X)$

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
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# Propensity Score

- Candidate  $b(x) = x$ , trivially satisfies:

$$p(X = x|x, t = 1) = p(X = x|x, t = 0) = 1$$





- $b(x) = x$  is the **finest** such function: OK for e.g. binary confounders, but only gives point estimates for (almost) continuous confounders!

- **Propensity score** is the **coarsest** such function (i.e. more data points, leading to better estimates):

$$e(x) = p(t = 1|x)$$

1-dimensional





# Propensity is balancing: Proof 2 [non-examinable]

The propensity score is a balancing score:  $X \perp\!\!\!\perp T|e(X)$

**Proof:** Need to show  $p_T(T = 1|X, e(X)) = p_T(T = 1|e(X))$

LHS:  $p_T(T = 1|X, e(X)) = p_T(T = 1|X) = e(X)$

↑  
Propensity score  
is a function of X

↑  
Propensity score  
definition

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RHS:

$$\mathbb{E}[Z|W] = \mathbb{E}_{V|W}[\mathbb{E}[Z|W, V]|W]$$

$$\begin{aligned} p_T(T = 1|e(X)) &= \mathbb{E}[T|e(X)] = \mathbb{E}_{X|e(X)} \left[ \underbrace{\mathbb{E}[T|e(X), X]}_{e(X)} | e(X) \right] \\ &= \mathbb{E}[e(X)|e(X)] = e(X) \end{aligned}$$

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Proof: Let  $b(x)$  be a balancing score. Suppose we **cannot** write the propensity score  $e(x)$  as  $e(x) = f(b(x))$ . Therefore, there must be a case where :  
 $b(x) = b(x') = b^*$  while  $e(x) \neq e(x')$ . Then,

$$p(t = 1 | \underline{x}, b(x)) = p(t = 1 | x) = e(x) \neq e(x') = p(t = 1 | x') = p(t = 1 | x', \underline{b(x')})$$

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$b^*$   $b^*$

Recall definition of balancing score:

$$x \perp\!\!\!\perp t | b(x)$$

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$$p(t = 1|x, b(x)) \neq p(t = 1|x', b(x'))$$

i.e., probability of treatment changes depending on value of  $x$  **despite**  $b^*$ :

$$x \not\perp t | b(x)$$

This violates the definition of a balancing score.

Proof by contradiction.

# Propensity Score Matching Algorithms

- Match control and treatment individuals based on their propensity score
- Greedy matching:
  - Randomly order list of control and treated.
  - Start with the first individual from e.g. treated and match to control with the smallest distance (i.e. obtains the **local** minimum)
  - Remove individuals from control and matched treated
  - Move to the next treated subject

Treatment	Control
40	50
65	25

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- Optimal matching: Minimises the **global** distance, computationally demanding
- **ATE:**  $\tau = \hat{\mathbb{E}}[\tau^{(i)}] = \hat{\mathbb{E}}[y_1^{(i)} - y_0^{(i)}] = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=0}^N \left( y_1^{(i)} - y_0^{(i)} \right)$

# Inverse Probability of Treatment Weighting (IPTW)

- Inflate the weight for under represented-subjects due to missing data
- Based on propensity score
- Weight: inverse probability of receiving observed treatment, for individual  $i$  with covariate  $x$ :

$$w_i = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{e(x_i)} & \text{if } t_i = 1 \\ \frac{1}{1-e(x_i)} & \text{if } t_i = 0 \end{cases}$$

$e(x) = p(t = 1|x)$


- Example: Suppose individual (i) has a large  $e(x)$ , i.e., their probability of receiving treatment is high. For (i)'s observed treatment,
  - If  $t_i = 1$  then  $w_i \approx 1$  (typical behaviour: most with  $x_i$  are treated)
  - If  $t_i = 0$  then  $w_i \gg 1$  (underrepresented: boost weight for rare event)

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$$e(x) = p(t = 1|x)$$



# Inverse Probability of Treatment Weighting (IPTW)

$$e(x) = p(t = 1|x)$$

$$\frac{1}{N} \sum_{\text{treated}} y_{\underline{1}}^{(i)} \frac{1}{e(x_i)} - \frac{1}{N} \sum_{\text{not treated}} y_{\underline{0}}^{(i)} \frac{1}{1 - e(x_i)}$$

Weights may be inaccurate/unstable for subjects with a very low probability of receiving the observed treatment (other estimators exist)

In a randomised control trial (RCT) limit,  $p(t = 1|x) = p(t = 0|x)$   
above reduces to:

$$\frac{1}{N_1} \sum_{\text{treated}} y_{\underline{1}}^{(i)} - \frac{1}{N_0} \sum_{\text{not treated}} y_{\underline{0}}^{(i)}$$

$$N = N_1 + N_0$$

# Overview of the course

- **Lecture 1:** Introduction & Motivation, why do we care about causality?  
Why deriving causality from observational data is non-trivial.
- **Lecture 2:** Recap of probability theory, variables, events, conditional probabilities, independence, law of total probability, Bayes' rule
- **Lecture 3:** Recap of regression, multiple regression, graphs, SCM
- **Lecture 4-20:**

