

Quantum Cyber Security

Lecture 18: Post-Quantum Cryptography III

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21st March 2024



This Lecture: NTRU Public-Key Encryption

- 1 Ring over Finite Field: Intro with an example
- 2 NTRU Public-Key Encryption: The system and its security
- 3 NTRU an example

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Notation colour code: parameters and functions: **public** (blue), **private** (red), **secret but not used later** (brown)

Example: Ring $R = \mathbb{Z}[x]/x^{n-1}$ (explanation below)

- Polynomials, truncated at degree n , with integer coeff $p_i \in \mathbb{Z}$:
$$p(x) = p_0 + p_1x + \dots + p_{n-1}x^{n-1}$$
- Coefficients could be restricted to be in \mathbb{Z}_q
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Parameters:

- $(n - 1)$ maximum degree of polynomials. Additions of **exponents** of x are performed **mod n** .
- q prime number. Additions of **coefficients** (p_i 's) are performed **mod q**

Ring Over Finite Field: An Example

- **An example of operations:** Let $n = 3$; $q = 5$.

Consider the product of $f(x) \cdot g(x)$ in $\mathbb{Z}_5[x]/x^2$ where:

$$f(x) = 1 + 3x + 2x^2$$

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$$\begin{aligned} f(x) \cdot g(x) &= (1 + 3x + 2x^2)(2 + 4x + 3x^2) \\ &= 2 + 4x + 3x^2 + 6x + 12x^2 + 9x^3 + 4x^2 + 8x^3 + 6x^4 \end{aligned}$$

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Exponents are taken **mod 3**

$$\begin{aligned} f(x) \cdot g(x) &= 2 + 4x + 3x^2 + 6x + 12x^2 + 9x^0 + 4x^2 + 8x^0 + 6x^1 \\ &= 19 + 16x + 19x^2 \end{aligned}$$

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Coefficients are taken **mod 5**

$$f(x) \cdot g(x) = 4 + x + 4x^2$$

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- Name: N(th degree) T(runcated polynomial) R(ing) U(nits)
- Both Encryption and Signatures algorithms (the former here)
- Very efficient, believed to be secure against quantum attacks
- Other versions (less efficient) have less “algebraic” structure and the hardness belief is more formally established
- No attack that uses that algebraic structure has been found (so initial version is still a valid candidate)

NTRU Encryption Scheme

Parameters: $(n - 1)$ max degree of polynomials, q prime number (large mod), p prime number (small mod), d coef.

Polynomials in $\mathbb{Z}[x]/x^{n-1}$, **operations** in either $\mathbb{Z}_q[x]/x^{n-1}$ or $\mathbb{Z}_p[x]/x^{n-1}$.

Conditions on Parameters: correctness holds provided:
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- Compute the inverses f_p^{-1}, f_q^{-1} of f w.r.t. modulo p, q :
 $f(x) \cdot f_p^{-1}(x) = 1 \pmod p$; $f(x) \cdot f_q^{-1}(x) = 1 \pmod q$
- Compute $h(x) = p (f_q^{-1}(x) \cdot g(x)) \pmod q$

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- Compute $h(x) = p (f_q^{-1}(x) \cdot g(x)) \pmod q$
- **Private Key:** $f(x), f_p^{-1}(x)$
- **Public Key:** $h(x)$

② $\text{Enc}(h(x), \mu)$:

- Express message μ as a polynomial $\mu(x)$ with coefficients modulo p (centred around zero).

Example: if $p = 2$ then a n -bit message is mapped to a $(n - 1)$ degree polynomial, with $0/1$ coefficients.

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3 Dec($e(x)$, $(f(x), f_p^{-1}(x))$):

- Computes $a(x) = f(x) \cdot e(x) \pmod{q}$
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- Computes $b(x) = a(x) \pmod{p}$
- Recovers message $\mu'(x) = f_p^{-1}(x)b(x) \pmod{p}$

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Recall $h(x) = pf_q^{-1}(x) \cdot g(x) \bmod q$ and the first term simplifies using $f(x)f_q^{-1}(x) = 1 \bmod q$:

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Now $b(x) = a(x) \bmod p$ and the first term cancels (since it is multiplied by p)

$$b(x) = (f(x) \cdot \mu(x) \bmod q) \bmod p$$

Provided that $a(x)$ was centred in zero, $f(x)$ has small coefficients and $\mu(x)$ has coefficients in $[0, p - 1]$ we have

$$\begin{aligned}\mu'(x) &= f_p^{-1}(x) (f(x) \cdot \mu(x) \bmod q) \bmod p \\ &= (f_p^{-1}(x) \cdot f(x) \cdot \mu(x)) \bmod p \\ &= \mu(x) \bmod p\end{aligned}$$

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Intuitively the $h(x) \cdot r(x)$ “masks” the message and only with the secret key one can “cancel” this term.

Parameters: $(n, p, q, d) = (7, 3, 41, 2)$

Check: $q > (6d + 1)p$ is satisfied $41 > (6 \times 2 + 1) \times 3 = 39$

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- $f(x) = x^6 - x^4 + x^3 + x^2 - 1$; $g(x) = x^6 + x^4 - x^2 - x$

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- $f(x) = x^6 - x^4 + x^3 + x^2 - 1$; $g(x) = x^6 + x^4 - x^2 - x$
- $f_3^{-1}(x) = x^6 + 2x^5 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1 \pmod{3}$
- $f_{41}^{-1}(x) = 8x^6 + 26x^5 + 31x^4 + 21x^3 + 40x^2 + 2x + 37 \pmod{41}$

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- Check: $f(x) \cdot f_3^{-1}(x) = 1 \pmod{3}$; $f(x) \cdot f_{41}^{-1}(x) = 1 \pmod{41}$

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- $f_{41}^{-1}(x) = 8x^6 + 26x^5 + 31x^4 + 21x^3 + 40x^2 + 2x + 37 \pmod{41}$
 Check: $f(x) \cdot f_3^{-1}(x) = 1 \pmod{3}$; $f(x) \cdot f_{41}^{-1}(x) = 1 \pmod{41}$
- **Private Key:** $f(x)$; $f_3^{-1}(x)$
- **Public Key:** $h(x) = p (f_q^{-1}(x) \cdot g(x)) \pmod{q}$
 $h(x) = 20x^6 + 40x^5 + 2x^4 + 38x^3 + 8x^2 + 26x + 30 \pmod{41}$

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Note: if p was even, coef. not exactly centred around zero.

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- Ciphertext $e(x) := r(x) \cdot h(x) + \mu(x) \pmod q$

$$e(x) = 31x^6 + 19x^5 + 4x^4 + 2x^3 + 40x^2 + 3x + 25 \pmod{41}$$

3 Dec($e(x)$, $f(x)$, $f_3^{-1}(x)$)

- Compute $a(x) = f(x) \cdot e(x) \pmod{q}$

$$a(x) = x^6 + 10x^5 + 33x^4 + 40x^3 + 40x^2 + x + 40 \pmod{41}$$

which written with coefficients from $[-20, 20]$ becomes:

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- Recovers message: $\mu(x) = f_p^{-1}(x)b(x) \pmod{p}$

$$\text{Recall } f_3^{-1}(x) = x^6 + 2x^5 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1$$

$$\mu(x) = -x^5 + x^3 + x^2 - x + 1 \rightarrow \mu = 1012202$$