Quantum Cyber Security
Lecture 12: Quantum Coin Flipping

Petros Wallden

University of Edinburgh

3rd March 2026

This Lecture: Quantum Coin-flipping

1. Motivation and Definition

2. Classical Coin-Flipping (impossibility)

3. Quantum Coin-Flipping

4. Protocols

5. Weak Coin-Flipping

6. Implementations

Coin Flipping

Two distant people, need to decide e.g. who will pick the music!

Who gets to pick the music ❓

- Cryptographic task (people have incentive to cheat)
- Introduced formally by Blum 1983

Definition

(Strong) Coin Flipping

The task of coin flipping consists of two mutually distrustful players, Alice and Bob, and the goal is for both players to output the same random bit $c \in \{0,1\}$ such that the following properties hold

1. **Correctness:** if both Alice and Bob are honest then c is uniformly distributed: $p(c = 0) = p(c = 1) = 1/2$.

2. ϵ-**secure:** neither player can force $p(c = 0) \geq 1/2 + \epsilon$ or $p(c = 1) \geq 1/2 + \epsilon$, where $p(c)$ is the probability that the honest player outputs a value c.

   The smallest ϵ a protocol is ϵ-secure is called the **bias**.

Q: Is Information Theoretic Secure coin flipping possible?

- Alice picks a random bit $a \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$

- Alice send a to Bob

- Bob picks a random bit $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$

- Bob sends b to Alice

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- Both return $c := a \oplus b$

An (insecure) classical coin flipping protocol

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- Alice send a to Bob
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  The protocol is **correct**, bit is **NOT secure** (at all)

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- Why is this protocol insecure?

- Alice picks a random bit $a \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$

- Alice send a to Bob

- Bob picks a random bit $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$

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- Why is this protocol insecure?

- Bob can select his bit after seeing Alice's and can bias the coin as he desires!

Impossibility of classical coin flipping

> **Impossibility of classical info theoretic secure coin flipping [Blum83]**
>
> No classical coin flipping protocol is secure, i.e. no value of $\epsilon < 1/2$ can be achieved for security!

- If Alice can't bias then Bob can completely bias the coin

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- If Alice can't bias then Bob can completely bias the coin
- Assume a protocol of n-rounds of interaction
- Let k be the last round that the value of c is not fixed
- The party that runs round k can fully bias the outcome

Classical Coin Flipping under Assumptions

- Coin Flipping is possible with computational assumptions

- An example is assuming the existence of secure one-way functions (OWF), [Blum 83]

- **OWF**: A function f that can be computed efficiently but cannot be inverted efficiently

  (efficiently is understood as "in poly-time")

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- An example is assuming the existence of secure one-way functions (OWF), [Blum 83]
- **OWF**: A function f that can be computed efficiently but cannot be inverted efficiently

  (efficiently is understood as "in poly-time")
- Alice chooses bit a and string r randomly
- Alice sends to Bob $f(a, r) = d$ (commits a)
- Bob chooses bit b and sends it to Alice
- Alice announces a, r to Bob
- Bob checks that $f(a, r) = d$ and if yes they proceed
- They both return $c = a \oplus b$

- Alice 'commits' to a bit a sending $\mathrm{commit}(a) = d$ to Bob

- Bob sends his bit b to Alice

- Alice reveals her commitment $\mathrm{reveal}(d) = a$

- Bob (if reveal is compatible with the commitment) accepts to proceed (otherwise aborts)

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- Both output $c = a \oplus b$
- Commitment is impossible (classically or quantumly) with ITS, but quantumly can achieve protocol with non-trivial bias ϵ using this idea

Quantum Coin Flipping

- Quantum transcript of a round contains information that may not be "extractible"

- Can (partly) evade the problem that there is a round that after that round (and not earlier) the output bit is determined

- Alice attempts to (partially) commit to message by encoding to a quantum state

- Cannot achieve zero bias, but can achieve $\epsilon < 1/2$

- Recall, bias $\epsilon < 1/2$ is defined as the largest probability that any of the two players can bias the coin towards one outcome.

Qubit QCF protocol (Aharanov 2000)

- Family of protocols, one for each choice ϕ

- Define the states $|\phi_{x,a}\rangle$ (note x is the basis bit, a the 'outcome' bit, check orthogonality!):

$$|\phi_{0,0}\rangle = \cos\phi\,|0\rangle + \sin\phi\,|1\rangle \;\; ; \;\; |\phi_{0,1}\rangle = \sin\phi\,|0\rangle - \cos\phi\,|1\rangle$$

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- Alice prepares the state $|\phi_{x,a}\rangle$ and sends it to Bob

- Bob sends his bit b

- Alice reveals x, a, Bob meas. in x-basis, checks if he gets a

- They return $c = a \oplus b$

- ϵ-bias: $\epsilon + 1/2 = \max\{Pr(\text{Alice win}), Pr(\text{Bob win})\}$

- **Alice to cheat:** Preparing the wrong states (different, non-uniform random); giving wrong information about (x, a)

- **Bob to cheat:** Try to determine (x, a) from Alice's states, and reveal some info on Alice's choice before he gives his bit b

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Aharanov's Protocol Security

The protocol is ϵ-secure with bias at most 0.42

Cheating probabilities and ϵ-bias

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Aharanov's Protocol Security

The protocol is ϵ-secure with bias at most 0.42

- For different ϕ's the two probabilities scale inversely

- For $\phi = \frac{\pi}{8}$, we have the best bias that leads to $Pr(\text{Alice win}) \leq 0.914$ and $Pr(\text{Bob win}) \leq 0.86$

Bob's optimal cheating probabilities

- Bob want to distinguish two cases: $a = 0$ and $a = 1$, without any information on x.

- $\rho_{a=0} = \frac{1}{2}(|\phi_{0,0}\rangle \langle\phi_{0,0}| + |\phi_{1,0}\rangle \langle\phi_{1,0}|)$

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- Maximum distinguishing probability:

  $p_{dist}^{opt} = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2}T(\rho_{a=0}, \rho_{a=1}) = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4}\|\rho_{a=0} - \rho_{a=1}\|$

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  $\rho_0 = \cos^2\phi |0\rangle\langle 0| + \sin^2\phi |1\rangle\langle 1| \; ; \; \rho_1 = \sin^2\phi |0\rangle\langle 0| + \cos^2\phi |1\rangle\langle 1|$

- $\|\rho_0 - \rho_1\| = 2\cos 2\phi$

- $Prob(\text{Bob win}) \leq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\cos 2\phi}{2}$

- Choosing $\phi = \pi/8$ (optimal to minimise Alice's probability): $Prob(\text{Bob win}) \approx 0.853$

Qutrit QCF protocol (Ambainis 2004)

- We consider qutrits (dim 3): $\{|0\rangle, |1\rangle, |2\rangle\}$

- Consider the four states (two pairs of orthogonal) $|\phi_{a,x}\rangle$:

$$|\phi_{a=0,x=0}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + |1\rangle) \ ; \ |\phi_{a=0,x=1}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle - |1\rangle)$$

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- Note: $\{|\phi_{0,x}\rangle, |2\rangle\}$ and $\{|\phi_{1,x}\rangle, |1\rangle\}$ are bases

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- (Both Alice and Bob can cheat with at most prob 0.75)
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Impossibility of Strong Quantum Coin Flipping

Perfect ($\epsilon \approx 0$) strong coin flipping is impossible for quantum protocols

Optimal biases for QCF

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- Kitaev proved that QCF need to have at least
  $\epsilon = \frac{\sqrt{2}-1}{2} \approx 0.207$ bias

Weak (quantum) coin flipping

Definition: Weak Coin Flipping

Same as strong CF, except the security where: **Alice** cannot force $p(c = 0) \geq 1/2 + \epsilon$, and **Bob** cannot force $p(c = 1) \geq 1/2 + \epsilon$.

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  - Impossible Classically
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- Rounds of interaction required scale as $N \sim 1/\epsilon$ at best

- Practical protocol with $\epsilon = 1/10$ exists, but open question to design protocol for arbitrarily small bias

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
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