
## Safety Systems

SCSD Lecture 14 Mar 2024

### IEC 61508

- 61508 is the basic standard for the safety of software-controlled equipment.
- Over the next two lectures we will consider this in some detail because it introduces the basic ideas that have been incorporated into many standards for software products.
- This will allow us to consider some specific techniques and how they are deployed.
- 61508 Considers the risks arising from the operation of the Equipment under control (EUC)
- It is comprehensive but gives particular consideration to the realization of software.

### APPLICATION OF IEC 61508



- There is equipment under control (EUC) which, with its control system, poses risks to its surroundings
- The risks will be reduced to tolerable levels by safety functions
- Safety functions are performed by E/E/PE systems

Ack: Felix Redmill

### **Overall Structure of 61508 series**

- We are mainly concerned with software.
- However, software can only be responsibe for harm via the EUC.
- Here we concentrate on Part 3: realization phase for safety-related software.





Figure 1 – Overall framework of the IEC 61508 series

### IEC 61509 Lifecycle







### Hardware Realisation




Figure 3 – E/E/PE system safety lifecycle (in realisation phase)

### Software Realisation




Figure 4 – Software safety lifecycle (in realisation phase)

### IEC 61508 Hardware/Software relationship





Figure 5 - Relationship and scope for IEC 61508-2 and IEC 61508-3

### IEC 61508 Software Development Lifecycle





### Software Lifecycle Detailed Overview

Safety lifecycle phase		Objectives	Scope	Require- ments subclause	Inputs (information required)	Outputs (information produced)
Figure 4 box number	Title	*				
10.1	Software safety requirements specification	To specify the requirements for safety-related software in terms of the requirements for software safety functions and the requirements for software systematic capability; To specify the requirements for the software safety functions for each E/E/PE safety-related system necessary to implement the required safety functions; To specify the requirements for software systematic capability for each E/E/PE safety-related system necessary to achieve the safety integrity level specified for each safety function allocated to that E/E/PE safety-related system	system	7.2.2	E/E/PE safety requirements specification as developed during allocation (see IEC 61508-1) E/E/PE system safety requirements specification (from IEC 61508-2)	software safety requirements specification
10.2	Validation plan for software aspects of system safety	To develop a plan for validating the software aspects of system safety	PE system; software system	7.3.2	software safety requirements specification	validation plan for software aspects of system safety

#### Table 1 - Software safety lifecycle - overview

### Software Lifecycle

		1				,
10.3	Software design and development	Architecture: To create a software architecture that fulfils the specified requirements for safety-related software with respect to the required safety integrity level; To evaluate the requirements placed on the software by the hardware architecture of the E/E/PE safety-related system, including the significance of E/E/PE hardware/software interactions for safety of the equipment under control	PE system; software system	7.4.3	hardware architecture	software architecture design; software architecture integration test specification; software/ PE integration test specification (also required by IEC 61508-2)
10.3	Software design and development	languages: To select a suitable set of tools, including languages and compilers, run-time system	PE system; software system; support tools; programming language	7.4.4	software safety requirements specification; software architecture design	support tools and coding standards; selection of development tools

### Risk guides the level of rigour in development




Figure A.1 – Risk reduction – general concepts (low demand mode of operation)

### Risk reduced to tolerable levels




Figure A.2 – Risk and safety integrity concept

# ALARP: One approach to achieving tolerable risk




Figure C.1 – Tolerable risk and ALARP

### **Risk Classes**

Frequency	Consequence					
	Catastrophic	Critical	Marginal	Negligible		
Frequent	I	I	1	Ш		
Probable	L	1	Ш	Ш		
Occasional	L	Ш	Ш			
Remote	П	Ш	Ш	IV		
Improbable	III	111	IV	IV		
Incredible	IV	IV	IV	IV		

#### Table C.1 – Example of risk classification of accidents

NOTE 1 The actual population with risk classes I, II, III and IV will be sector dependent and will also depend upon what the actual frequencies are for frequent, probable, etc. Therefore, this table should be seen as an example of how such a table could be populated, rather than as a specification for future use.

NOTE 2 Determination of the safety integrity level from the frequencies in this table is outlined in Annex D.

### **Risk Classes**

#### Table C.2 – Interpretation of risk classes

Risk class	Interpretation
Class I	Intolerable risk
Class II	Undesirable risk, and tolerable only if risk reduction is impracticable or if the costs are grossly disproportionate to the improvement gained
Class III	Tolerable risk if the cost of risk reduction would exceed the improvement gained
Class IV	Negligible risk

### Summary

- Introduced IEC 61508
- The overall lifecycle
- The software lifecycle
- Risk
- How risk informs software development
- Next lecture we will consider how this influences development practice