
Security Engineering

Ecosystems Security: App stores, incentives, markets. Windows and Azure; supply-chain attacks. Accessory control.

Supply Chain Attacks: Operation Gunman




Supply Chain Attacks (2): Cisco Routers



Supply Chain Attacks (3): Supermicro Motherboards

- Chip implanted into the motherboard to "phone home"
- Implant not placed in Supermicro's design, but altered at manufacture time!
- Is this easier than bugging the software? Or the BIOS (also hacked in this instance)?
- Who along the supply chain could get you? It's not always the easiest targets, but the most accessible.

Platform Security



Who is in charge?

Mobile Network Operator (MNO)

Handset Original
Equipment
Manufacturer (OEM)

OS Vendor

Chip Maker

Chip Designer

Platform Security: Android



How do updates **Propagate?**

Mobile Network Operator (MNO)	EE
Handset Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM)	HTC
OS Vendor	Google
Chip Maker	TSMC
Chip Designer	Qualcomm & ARM


Why is Android Free?

Platform Security: Apple




Mobile Network Operator (MNO)	EE
Handset Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM)	Apple
OS Vendor	Apple
Chip Maker	TSMC/Samsung
Chip Designer	Apple & ARM

Platform Security: Apple



App Store Ecosystems




App Store Ecosystems














App Store Ecosystems

Mobile Network Operator (MNO)	EE
Handset Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM)	HTC
OS Vendor	Google

Google Play

Apps (8) Update all Manage apps and device \leftarrow Android Accessibility... Update Overview Manage 29 MB · Updated on 2... Facebook Update No harmful apps found 52 MB · Updated 4 da... (P) Play Protect scanned at 09:34 Google Home Update 17 MB · Updated on 2... Updates available 80 8 updates pending Google Maps Update Update all See details 30 MB · Updated at 0... Microsoft SwiftKey K... Share apps Receive 10% Send Update 9.5 MB · Updated on... \bigcirc Ratings and reviews NHS COVID-19 NHS COVID-19 Update 8 MB · Updated on 1... WhatsApp Messenger Update 17 MB · Updated on 1...

 \leftarrow

Pending downloads


Google Play (2)

- Self-signed applications (unlike iOS)
- Default with no "Install Apps from External Sources" – security and lock-in
- App Security Improvement Program


Google App Security

- Suite of Sanitizers and Mitigators for User Code: BoundsSan, AddrSan, IntSan, Shadow Stacks, Scudo Hardened Allocator
- Not just about protecting Android the OS: if you extract rent from an ecosystem, you need to protect the 3rd party code too!

Android Security Updates




Android Update Lifecycle



https://androiddevelopers.googleblog.com/2017/05/herecomes-treble-modular-base-for.html

Android Update Lifecycle


Before Treble



https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2017/05/here-comes-treble-modular-base-for.html


Android Update Lifecycle

With Treble



https://androiddevelopers.googleblog.com/2017/05/herecomes-treble-modular-base-for.html

Android Update Lifecycle: Project Mainline



https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2019/05/fresher-os-with-projects-treble-and-mainline.html

Other Android App Security Mechanisms


- From the Chip Vendor: TrustZone.
- Obfuscation: mandatory in banking.
- Android KeyStore
- SIM locking: device in the custody of the attacker!

Apple



- (Semi)-closed ecosystem.
- 30% commission on products sold through App Store, incl. IAPs – antitrust issues e.g. Epic Games Lawsuit
- Patches for 5ish years why does Apple have more incentive here?
- Largely closed source there is obscurity, but is it part of the security?

Apple IDFA



Your data will be used to deliver personalized ads to you.

Allow Tracking

Ask App Not to Track

App Ecosystem (Continued)

- Apps can be/go bad for many reasons.
- "We Purchase Apps" ad fraud.
- Tussles around trust in Ad Networks even in reputable apps: e.g. CamScanner started dropping Trojans on phones!
- Google: Apps assumed bad and contained.
 Windows: global visibility, with Antivirus to do the heavy lifting.
- Google Play Store still has trouble with "Repackaging": adding "Riders" to "Carrier" apps.

"Why is Windows so Insecure?"

- Medical and defence can build dependable systems, so why was Win95/98 totally defenceless?
- "Ship it Tuesday and get it right by Version 3".
- Competition *for* the market: rational to get as much (poorly written) software as quickly as possible.
- Initial vs Sustained Velocity, and Technical Debt
- "Bargains then Ripoffs" not just poor security, but dumping costs on users also rational behaviour.

Microsoft "turned their s*** around"

- "I would always make a point of asking hackers, 'I know you hate the vendors, but of all of them, who do you hate least?' The answer was always the same. 'Microsoft,' they would tell me. 'They turned their s*** around.'" Nicole Perlroth
- From XP Onwards: free security tools, secure coding training for all staff, patching.
- BUT more effort went into protecting premium video than credit card numbers!

Maturing your Ecosystem

- What might a patch to fix a bug break, in the Windows Software *Ecosystem*?
- ...With legacy code that likely assumes it's running as admin?
- Sustained Velocity bites...
- Can you change your Ecosystem to make it more secure? Microsoft tried and failed with the Windows App Store, Universal Windows Apps, and Windows 10S.
- Is this all Microsoft's fault? Why target OSX when Windows has 5x the users...

Azure

- Microsoft moving to a new ecosystem... the CLOUD.
- Not just about using Microsoft's Server Hardware also about using their software ecosystem.
- Azure Security Centre: Compliance reporting, threat modelling, crypto standards, managing risks of 3rd-party components, pen testing.
- "Bargains then Ripoffs"

Azure - Encryption

- HSMs now maintained by Azure or Amazon, not the bank!
- Double Encryption DRM
- Cloud Key vault


Code Supply Chain

- Can insiders (un)intentionally get bad code committed to release?
- Who is an "insider" for the software running in your device? Think about your OS kernel, libraries...
- Code reviews are a form of multi-party authorisation, but be careful to avoid rubberstamping...
- In this scenario, bugs aren't random they're introduced to open-source projects with wide use!

Code Supply Chain (2)

- Who makes the decision to integrate patches into your products?
- Third-party code review: keep an internal version and review upstream patches as they appear.
- The Compiler is part of your TCB!
- Code signing can help you work out provenance, but watch out for your keys leaking, and beware of who has signing keys...

Vulnerability Market Ecosystems



Whose Fault is it Anyway?

- Incentives are to blame shift both to partners in your ecosystem, and even within teams in the same company.
- Your hardware teams will blame your software teams: who should actually fix it?
- BIDI attacks: Compiler? Editor? Build environment? Repository code-smell checking? The easiest deployment may not be the cheapest or most comprehensive...


Accessory Control

Razors and Blades Model

- Two-part pricing.
- Lexmark vs SCC 2004: free market for cryptologists!







Example: Overrun Prevention

- Accessory Control gets complicated with complex supply chains
- E.g. you're an IP vendor selling a circuit design to be run on cameras at \$2 per camera.
- You sell licenses for 100k cameras, and find 200k appear on the market.
- IP Vendor -> Camera Company -> Factory. Who has incentives to cheat?

Is Accessory Control Objectionable?

- Depends how competitive the markets are.
- BUT tech entrenches and causes monopolies...
- Right-to-Repair Laws a common battleground.
- Sustainability: accessory control usually lowers lifetimes.