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
Ecosystems Security


Security Engineering (Spring 2026)

Lecturer: Jingjie Li & Daniel Woods





Extreme Ultraviolet Lithography (EUV) machines – why so important?






- Security is segmented in supply chain and ecosystems
- Original equipment manufacturer
- Things get complicated when attacker is really motivated and is capable
- Economics under building and governing a secure ecosystem

Hardware supplychain



- Designers do not have full visibility into the manufacturing process
- Complexity of the hardware makes bugs and vulnerabilities even hard to find
- Designers/vendors even rely on reverse engineering to ensure IP/chip integrity

Hardware trojan



Hardware reverse engineering

- Sample preparation
- SEM imaging
- Image processing
- Circuit extraction
- Circuit analysis...





Figure 3. Examples of a decapped chip along with an optical microscopic image of inside.

e to expose the Qualcomm MSM
chip.

Accessory control



- Locking users and developers through digital right management (DRM)
- DRM via security printing, obfuscation, temper-resistance, license check, etc.

Accessory control

Hardware hacker tries to run NVMe SSD on the Switch 2 but fails — adapter doesn't light up NVMe SSD controller but could work in the future with microSD Express emulation


News By Aaron Klotz published 6 August 2025

The open-source community is trying new methods to expand the Switch 2's storage, without resorting to ultra-expensive microSD Express cards



- People are incentivized to cheat!
- E.g. you're an IP vendor selling a circuit design to be run on cameras at \$2 per camera.
- You sell licenses for 100k cameras, and find 200k appear on the market.
- IP Vendor -> Camera Company -> Factory. Who has incentives to cheat?


Software and code supply chain



<https://canartuc.medium.com/linux-kernel-maintainer-succession-the-crisis-hiding-in-plain-sight-295105d236b1>

- Can insiders (un)intentionally get bad code committed to release?
- Who is an “insider” for the software running in your device? Think about your OS kernel, libraries...
- Code reviews are a form of multi-party authorisation, but be careful to avoid rubberstamping...
- In this scenario, bugs aren’t random – they’re introduced to open-source projects with wide use!


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- Who makes the decision to integrate patches into your products?
- Third-party code review: keep an internal version and review upstream patches as they appear.
- The Compiler is part of your trust code base
- Code signing can help you work out provenance, but watch out for your keys leaking, and beware of who has signing keys...

How to report vulnerability? Or should people even report?



- (Properly) reporting vulnerability is not easy, e.g., avoid zero days
- Risks on the reporters
- Misaligned incentives
- How people benefit from reporting?

Platform Security



- Security was fragmented along the supplychain
- Device platform design is not heterogeneous

Android platform



Mobile Network Operator (MNO)	EE
Handset Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM)	HTC
OS Vendor	Google
Chip Maker	TSMC
Chip Designer	Qualcomm & ARM

- Google taking control of the Android ecosystem, but still a lot of vendors!
- Updates propagates from bottom
- Who is incentivized to fix a bug? Most likely Google?

Why is Android free? Where do they make profit from?




Apple platform



Mobile Network Operator (MNO)	EE
Handset Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM)	Apple
OS Vendor	Apple
Chip Maker	TSMC/Samsung
Chip Designer	Apple & ARM


- More vertically integrated
- Semi-closed ecosystem
- Apple breaking dependencies on MNO for update
- Longer update coverage due to fewer tussles

Appstores




- ~30% of sales profit shared!
- Bundled and locked in entry point – leaving very few options for app developer
- Making apps more predatory (ad, paying, privacy / identity breach...)

Appstores



- Free download + ad + data theft + microtransaction > paid premium apps
- No internet access control in Android
- Ads making into the app sandbox, inheriting permissions

Google Play




- Self-signed applications (unlike iOS)
- Default with no “Install Apps from External Sources” – security and lock-in
- App Security Improvement Program scanning whole store for harmful apps
- Suite of Sanitizers for User Code: BoundsSan, AddrSan, IntSan, Shadow Stack, Scudo
- Protecting third-party as well, why?

Android update





Android update





- Making OS implementation modular (isolated)
- Updates still need to push through (OEM) original equipment manufacturer.....

Android update: Mainline





- Further modularization, delivering OS updates through Google Play infrastructure



Takeaway: vendors try to take back control, including security policy and exploits, from others



Think: externalities and internalities for implementing lower-level security policies?






Apple



- (Semi)-closed ecosystem, apps signing by apple. Positioning as the company of privacy
- What is the incentive for Apple's third-party app opt out?
- Security claim vs reality?
- Largely closed source – there is obscurity, but is it part of the security?

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 - Incentivization of fixing things aligns due to vertical integration
 - Hard to vet though

Microsoft



- Compatibility slows things down, and Windows App market fails
- Start fresh with Azure Cloud (hardware + software)
- Azure Security Centre: Compliance reporting, threat modelling, crypto standards, managing risks of 3rd-party components, pen testing