Memory corruption recap

**Buffer overflow** is still one of the most common vulnerabilities being discovered and exploited in commodity software.

We’ve seen examples of **stack and heap buffer overflow** vulnerabilities due to copying without checking bounds.

In this lecture we’ll see other memory corruption vulnerabilities and discuss countermeasures.

Buffer overflow risks have been known for over 30 years. Is it still a problem? Try searching at [https://nvd.nist.gov](https://nvd.nist.gov) to see.
Outline

Other memory corruption errors
   Out-by-one, overflow, pointer arithmetic
   Type confusion errors

Memory corruption countermeasures
   Tamper detection
   Memory mode protection
   Diversification
   Defensive programming

Summary
Other memory corruption errors

Copying data from one place to another isn’t the only source of memory corruption.

Other mistakes can be made by errors with

- out-by-one errors
- overflowing data values
- pointer arithmetic

**Exercise.** Find and explain an example of a pointer arithmetic bug leading to a code vulnerability.
Outline

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Summary
Out-by-one errors

▶ Mistaking the size of array

```c
for (i=0; i<=sizeof(dest); i++)
    dest[i]=src[i];
```

▶ Forgetting to account for string terminator in C

```c
if (strlen(user) > sizeof(buf))
    die("user string too long\n");
strcpy(buf, user);
```

These are typical programming errors.

They *may* cause exploitable memory corruption, depending on the rest of the application code.
Integer overflow

Integer overflow (wrap-around) can cause memory corruption.

Worrying case: bounds calculated from user inputs.

```c
char *make_table(int width, int height, char* defaultrow) {
    char *buf;
    int i;
    int n = width * height;
    buf = (char*)malloc(n);
    int i;
    if (!buf)
        return NULL;
    for (i=0; i<height; i++)
        memcpy(&buf[i*width], defaultrow, width);
}
```

**Exercise.** Show that with carefully chosen width and height, it’s possible to perform a massive overflow.
Outline

Other memory corruption errors
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Summary
A programming language, analysis tool or runtime is said to enforce **type safety** if it has a clearly specified typing discipline for data values and it ensures that data values (representations) for types stay within the domain of those types during program execution.

**Question.** Can you have Memory Safety without Type Safety?

**Question.** Or the other way: Type Safety but not Memory Safety?
C is not type safe!

C has overly flexible typing:

- **implicit type conversions**, inserted automatically by the compiler, often for convenience of arithmetic combining differently sized primitives.
- **explicit type casts**, where the programmer writes
  \[
  \text{foo} = (\text{sometype}) \text{bar};
  \]
  A value in one type is treated as a value of another type. For pointers, there is no effect: the pointed-to values are not altered.

Numeric conversions may perform *sign extension* or *truncation*.

Some conversions are implementation defined (i.e., are not pinned down by the language, so vary depending on the compiler, platform, etc).
Signed integer comparison vulnerability

```c
int read_user_data(int socketfd) {
    int length;
    char buffer[1024];
    length = get_user_length(socketfd);

    if (length>1024) {
        error("Input size too large\n");
        return -1;
    }
    if (recv(socketfd, buffer, length)<0) {
        error("Read format error\n");
        return -1;
    }
    return 0; // success
}
```

- Here, a negative length defeats the size check...
- but recv accepts a size_t type, which is unsigned
- a negative value becomes a large positive one
- ...and recv() overflows buffer.
Outline

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Summary
Memory corruption countermeasures

Two basic programming-related countermeasures:

1. Treat the symptoms:
   ▶ special technologies in execution or compilation
   ▶ limit the damage that can be done by attacks
   ▶ uses containment and curtailment

2. Treat the cause:
   ▶ ensure that code does not contain vulnerabilities
   ▶ secure programming through code review
   ▶ security analysis tools to find and fix problems

Question. Why might choice 2 be impossible?
Generic defences

Defensive technologies are not a real substitute for proper fixes, but:

▶ give *defence in depth* that can protect in case of new attacks, malware, regressions to vulnerable code
▶ sometimes code replacement is simply *prohibitively expensive* or *impossible* (e.g., non-upgradeable firmware) so defences must be put elsewhere.

**Exercise.** Find and explain some interesting examples of the latter case.
Defences against overflows

Several generic protection mechanisms have been invented to prevent overflow attacks and new ones are evolving.

These reduce the attacker’s chance of reliably exploiting a bug on the host system.

We will look at:

- Tamper detection in software
- Memory protection in OS and hardware
- Diversification methods
Outline

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Summary
Canaries on the stack

Stack frame has vulnerable location pointers which are corrupted in a stack overflow attack. Idea:

- wrap frame with protective layer, a “canary”
- canary sits below return address
- attacker overflows stack buffer to hit return address
  - necessarily overwrites canary
- generated code adds and checks canaries

Early proposal: *StackGuard* compiler.
Stack without canaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>saved EIP (return addr)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>saved EBP (frame ptr)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local variables...</td>
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<td>...</td>
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</table>
Stack with canary

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<tr>
<td>saved EIP (return addr)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>saved EBP (frame ptr)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>canary word(s)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local variables...</td>
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<tr>
<td>...</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The "canary" is special data written into the stack to detect unexpected modifications. If a stack overflow or other corruption occurs, the canary may be altered. The compiler adds extra instructions to insert canaries and check their integrity.

**Question.** How might the mechanism be defeated?

**Question.** What should happen if an overflow is detected?
Consider this C program:

```c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

int fun1(char *arg) {
    char buffer[1024];
    strcpy(buffer, arg);
}

void main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
    fun1(argv[1]);
}
```

Let’s compare the assembler compiled with `gcc -S -m32` and `gcc -S -m32 -fno-stack-protector`. 
main: ; code without SSP: gcc -S -m32 -fno-stack-protector

pushl %ebp
movl %esp, %ebp
andl $-16, %esp ; align stack to 16-byte
subl $16, %esp ;
movl 12(%ebp), %eax ; eax = addr of argv
addl $4, %eax ; eax = addr of argv[1]
movl (%eax), %eax ; eax = contents of argv[1]
movl %eax, (%esp) ; push it
call fun1 ;
leave
ret

fun1:

pushl %ebp ; save old frame ptr
movl %esp, %ebp ; set new frame ptr
subl $1048, %esp ; allocate stack space
movl 8(%ebp), %eax ;
movl %eax, 4(%esp) ; push arg (strcpy src)
leal -1032(%ebp), %eax
movl %eax, (%esp) ; push buffer (strcpy dest)
call strcpy
leave
ret
fun1: ; code with SSP (main function stays the same)
    ; NB: GS register points to per-CPU thread storage
    pushl %ebp
    movl %esp, %ebp
    subl $1064, %esp
    movl 8(%ebp), %eax
    movl %eax, -1052(%ebp)
    movl %gs:20, %eax
    movl %eax, -12(%ebp)
    xorl %eax, %eax
    movl -1052(%ebp), %eax
    movl %eax, 4(%esp)
    leal -1036(%ebp), %eax
    movl %eax, (%esp)
    call strcpy
    movl -12(%ebp), %edx
    xorl %gs:20, %edx
    je .L3
    call __stack_chk_fail
.L3:
    leave
    ret
Exercise. Try this example for yourself, compiling with/without protection, and stepping through it using gdb. Draw the stack layout in each case. Make up some more complex examples and try them out.
Security “arms race” and canaries

Attackers respond to new protection mechanisms by looking for vulnerabilities in those mechanisms (as well as new vulns).

For example:

- Attack code/probing discovers a constant canary
  - e.g., canary is 0x0af237ab6, so write that near return address
- Canary defence uses pseudorandom sequence
  - attacker learns sequence or discovers seed
- Canary defences uses cryptographic PRNG
  - attacker finds where value is stored
  - finds another exploit to copy it
Stack canary effectiveness

- Doesn’t protect against local variable overwriting
  - related mechanisms reorder local variables
- Other attacks work by overwriting parameters
  - aim to change where subsequent writes occur
  - overwrite return address, but don’t return

Hardened heap implementations have also been developed

- glibc and Windows since XP SP2 have heap canaries
- but application specific heaps, and high-level language heaps are not covered
Better attacks, better detection

Return-to-libc (ret2libc) and return-oriented programming (ROP)

- key idea: re-use existing executable code
- defeats canaries and NX hardware protection

A more powerful defence mechanism is Control-Flow Integrity, which ensures that code execution follows a pre-determined call graph.

This can defend against ROP and similar attacks, depending on the accuracy and granularity of the enforcement.
Outline

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Summary
Operating system separation (review)

**Isolation** different processes have different resources (address spaces, file systems, . . .)

**Sharing** resources are shared between processes, partial isolation. Sharing may be:

- all or nothing
- mediated with access controls
- mediated with *usage* controls (capabilities)

Concern: *granularity* of protection.

OSes have provided separation mechanisms since the early days of multi-user systems. For memory, direct support was added to the CPU and memory system hardware.
Hardware memory protection mechanisms

Original mechanisms introduced to provide separation (mainly for safety) between different programs on multi-user systems:

- **Fences**: separate memory accesses between OS and user code (one boundary, one way protection).

- **Base and bounds registers**: enforce separation between several programs allowing access control on memory *ranges*.

- **Tagged architecture**: more fine-grained, tags on each memory location set access rights to stored word (R, RW, X). Supervisor mode instructions required to set tag. Not currently supported in modern architectures but research on new CPU-provided hardware capabilities is related.
Memory separation: segmentation & paging

**Segmentation** splits a program into named variable-sized logical pieces, (main, data, module, ...). Programs use names and offsets; segment registers and an OS segment table for indexing.

**Paging** splits program/data into fixed-sized pieces. These get mapped onto memory, which is split into equal sized *page frames*.

Segmentation mechanisms were introduced mainly to expand addressable memory ranges for 16-bit CPUs. Modern OSes use a *flat memory model* without hardware-supported segmentation.

Paging is still used to manage memory across different hardware locations (cache levels, RAM, disk).

Segmentation and paging both have security features/implications.
Non-executable memory pages

CPUs include R, RW, X protection for memory pages.

- x86 series CPUs added page-level XD/NX in 2001-4
- Data Execution Prevention: attempt to execute causes page-fault

If the program keeps code and data separate, shellcode can be prevented from running when it’s injected into data regions on the heap or stack.

Apart from C, this may be tricky to use with certain languages/compilers/interpreters that manipulate executable code during runtime.
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Summary
**Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)**

**Diversification**: make many versions of same program; thwarts general attacks that assume some fixed structure.

**ASLR**: randomising layout during load time makes it harder to find data or code locations, breaking hard-coded static locations. Provided in Linux from 2001 by the **PaX Team**.

**Effectiveness**: strong, but doesn’t solve underlying problem and ASLR implementation becomes target of attack. Early implementations randomised by small amounts (e.g. 256 addresses), so attacker could use brute force (though this may attract attention).

**Question**: What other things could be diversified as a defence mechanism?
EWiM attack model [Oakland 2013]

- **V.I. Memory Safety**
  - VI. Memory Safety
  - V.A. Address Space Randomization
  - V.B. Data Integrity
  - VII. Data Space Randomization
  - VII.A. Data Integrity
  - VII.B. Data-flow Integrity
  - VIII. Code Integrity
  - VIII.A. Code Pointer Integrity
  - VIII.B. Control-flow Integrity

- **Make a pointer go out of bounds**
  - Make a pointer become dangling
  - Use pointer to write (or free)
  - Use pointer to read

- **Modify a data pointer**
  - Modify code ...
  - ... to the attacker specified code
  - Instruction Set Randomization

- **Modify a code pointer**
  - Modify a code pointer ...
  - ... to the address of shellcode / gadget
  - V.A. Code Pointer Integrity
  - Address Space Randomization

- **Modify a data variable**
  - Modify a data variable ...
  - ... to the attacker specified value
  - VII.A. Data Integrity
  - Data Integrity

- **Output data variable**
  - Interpret the output data
  - V.B. Data Space Randomization

- **Use pointer by indirect call/jump**
  - Use pointer by return instruction
  - Use corrupted data variable
  - VIII.B. Control-flow Integrity
  - Data-flow Integrity

- **Execute available gadgets / functions**
  - Execute injected shellcode

- **Code corruption attack**
  - Control-flow hijack attack
  - Data-only attack
  - Information leak

- **printf(user_input);**
  - // input "%3$x" prints the 3rd integer on the stack

- **printf("%s\n", err_msg);**
  - For instance, the attacker is able to leak arbitrary memory contents in the above line of code by corrupting the `err_msg` pointer.

- **Temporal errors**
  - When a dangling pointer is dereferenced in Step 2, can be exploited similarly to spatial errors.
  - A constraint for exploitable temporal errors is that the memory area of the deallocated object (the old object) is reused by another object (new object).
  - The type mismatch between the old and new object can allow the attacker to access unintended memory.

- **Let us consider first reading through a dangling pointer with the old object's type but pointing to the new object, which is controlled by the attacker.**
  - When a virtual function of the old object is called and the virtual function pointer is looked up, the contents of the new object will be interpreted as the vtable pointer of the old object. This allows the corruption of the vtable pointer, comparable to exploiting a spatial write error, but in this case the dangling pointer is only dereferenced for a read.
  - An additional aspect of this attack is that the new object may contain sensitive information that can be leaked when read through the dangling pointer of the old object's type.
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Defensive programming

Summary
Defensive programming to avoid overflow requires **bounds checking**.

- Check **data lengths** before writing
- Check **array subscripts** are within limits
- Check **boundary conditions** to avoid OBO
- Constrain **size of inputs**
- Beware of **dangerous API calls** to risky code

This is a *shared responsibility*: we may trust the tool-chain or each part of the runtime to implement checks or ensure they are not needed.
Responsibility for bounds checking

Checks or guarantees could be given by the:

- programmer
- programming language, compiler
- OS
- hardware

(we’ll examine programmer checks next, others later).

**Exercise.** For each role, give an example of what could be done to check bounds and what might go wrong if a check isn’t done.
Bounds checks by programmer

```c
int a[20], i;
for (i=0, i<20; i++) {
    a[i] = 0;
    ...
}
```

**Question.** How can this go wrong?
Bounds checks by programmer

```c
int a[20], i;
for (i=0, i<20; i++) {
    if (i<0) signal error;
    if (i >= 20) signal error;
    a[i] = 0;
    ...
}
```

- Checking every time seems inefficient
- Are both checks required?
- Tempting to skip...
If bound is computed, *both* checks essential
But code reviews, programmer reasoning are *brittle*...
and languages have varying conventions
  Arrays start at 1 in Fortran, MATLAB, R, XQuery, ...
Automated code review and testing

Many **code checking tools** have been developed to try to automate security checking.

Split into *static* and *dynamic* approaches.

For memory faults, two common dynamic tools are 

**Valgrind**: maintains a *shadow* memory space to track previously used locations, can find use-after-free vulnerabilities. Dynamic translation, 10x slowdown in use.

**AddressSanitizer** instruments code at compile time (< 2x slowdown).
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Summary
Memory corruption attacks and defences

We’ve seen memory corruption attacks on the heap, on the stack and elsewhere.

Vulnerabilities in code are caused by:

- unchecked buffer boundaries
- pointer arithmetic errors, out-by-one errors
- value overflow, type confusion
- format string vulnerabilities

Countermeasures are generic defences or secure programming:

- Detect and abort: canaries
- Diversification: address randomisation (ASLR)
- Execution prevention (NX/DEP), Control Flow Integrity
- Programming: bounds checking, library functions, testing

Question. Why aren’t generic defences enough?
Why aren’t generic defences enough?

A wide variety of defences have been proposed and implemented.

Three main reasons that generic solutions are not always used/useful:

1. Performance
2. Compatibility
3. Completeness/robustness

Nonetheless, generic defences are still being improved and more widely deployed in practice.
Review questions

Memory corruption vulnerabilities

- Explain type confusion errors, giving an example.

Protection mechanisms

- Explain how StackGuard canaries prevent overflows. What attacks are they not effective against?
- How does hardware-assisted memory protection work and when may it be difficult to use?
- Explain the strategy of program diversification and how it is achieved in ASLR.

Avoiding overflow vulnerabilities

- Describe where bounds checking should be used to ensure “defence-in-depth”.
Some of the examples were adapted from *The Art of Software Security Assessment*.

The paper *Eternal War in Memory* surveys 30 years of memory corruption bug examples and their countermeasures.

The miner and canary image is a public domain picture available from the [Wikipedia page on domestic canaries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domestic_canary).