AGTA - Course Materials

Lecture 1 - 12 January 2026
Slides: What is Game Theory?   
No required reading. 
Some reference texts for the entire course (see slides of lecture 1 for a more comprehensive list):

• M. Maschler, E. Solan, and S. Zamir, Game Theory , Cambridge U. Press, 2013. 
  (Available online from the University Library.)
• N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. Vazirani, Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge U. Press, 2007. 
  (Available online from the University library.)
• Y. Shoham and K. Leyton-Brown, "Multi-agent Systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations", 2009. (MAS) 
  (Available online from the University library.)
• T. Roughgarden. Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge U. Press, 2016. 
  (Available online from the University library.)

Lecture 2  & Lecture 3 - 15th and 19th of January 2026
Slides for Lecture 2: Mixed Strategies, Expected Payoffs, and Nash Equilibrium.
Slides for Lecture 3: Nash's Theorem.

Reading for Lectures 2 and 3:
The classic:  John Nash, ``Non-cooperative Games'',  Annals of Mathematics, 1951.  (Only read pages 286--288.) 

Supplementary (not required) textbook reading for Lectures 2 and 3:
[Shoham&Leyton-Brown, Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) book, 2009, Chapter 3]
(This book is available digitally from the Edinburgh University Library.)

Light supplementary reading (not required):
Chapter 15: "Application to Biology: Evolutionarily Stable Strategies" (only pages 93--99) in the book : Philip D. Straffin, "Game Theory and Strategy",  AMS, 1993.   (This book is available digitally from the University of Edinburgh Library.)

Lecture 4 - 22 January 2026
Slides: 2-Player Zero-Sum Games and the Minimax Theorem

Supplementary reading (not required):
T.E.S. Raghavan,  "Zero-Sum Two-Person Games", Chapter 20 (only read pages 736--739) in 
Handbook of Game Theory, Volume 2, Edited by R. J. Aumann and S. Hart, Elsevier, 1994.
(This handbook is available digitally from the University of Edinburgh Library.)

Lecture 5 - 26 January 2026
Slides:  Introduction to Linear Programming

Reading for the next several lectures,  either:

V. Chvatal, Linear Programming, Freeman & Co., 1983.  
(Chapters 1-5 only; an electronic copy of these is available to AGTA students via the AGTA LEARN page under "Additional Course Materials")
Or, alternatively, another excellent textbook on linear programming is:
J. Matousek and B. Gaertner,  Understanding and Using Linear Programming,  Springer, 2006.
(This book is available digitally from the University Library.)

Lecture 6  - 29 January (&  2 February) 2026
Slides: The Simplex Algorithm

Reading: continue with Chvatal, or with Matousek&Gaertner.

Lecture 7  - 2 February  (& 5 February) 2026
Slides:  LP Duality 

Reading: continue with Chvatal, or with Matousek&Gaertner.

Lecture 8 - 5 February  (& 9 February) 2026
Slides:  Computing solutions for general finite strategic games, Part 1: Dominance and Iterated Strategy Elimination

Supplementary reference:
Pages 235--245 of:  A. Mas-Colell, M. D. Whinston, and J. Green, Microeconomic Theory,  OUP, 1995.
(Also, e.g., [Maschler,Solan-Zamir, GT book, section 4.5] or  [Shoham/Leyton-Brown MAS book, sections 3.4.3 & 3.4.4].)

Lecture 9 - 9 February  &  12 February 2026
Slides: Computing solutions for general finite strategic games, Part 2: Nash Equilibria

Supplementary references (all of these are available digitally from the University of Edinburgh Library):

R. D. McKelvey and A. McLennan.  "Computation of equilibria in Finite Games",  Chapter 2, in Handbook of Computational Economics, volume 1, 1996.  

B. von Stengel.  "Computing equilibria for two-person games", Chapter 45, in Handbook of Game Theory, volume 3, 2002.

[Shoham & Leyton-Brown MAS book,  Chapter 4: "Computing solution concepts for normal-form games".]

Lecture 10 - 16 February 2026
Slides:  Games in Extensive Form

Supplementary reference reading:
Sergiu Hart, "Games in Extensive and Strategic Form", Chapter 2 of Handbook
of Game Theory, volume 1.  (Available digitally from the University library.)

[Maschler, Solan, & Zamir Game Theory book,  Chapters 3 and 6.]

[Shoham & Leyton-Brown MAS book,  Chapter 5:   "Games with sequential actions"].